PLA Watch #4: Apr 2025
From Center for China Analysis: Newsletter on China’s Military Activities
Welcome to the April edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest developments in Chinese military affairs and writings using primary sources.
PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.
This month’s issue opens with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flexing its muscles around Taiwan in the Strait Thunder-2025A exercise, followed by the official launch of China’s new naval base in Cambodia. We also track the reported downfall of General He Weidong, delve into the Party’s push for political discipline through its “two polishes” and “rectification” campaigns, and examine persistent quality control issues in China’s defense industry.
Written by:
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis
Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis
With support from:
Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis
Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis
Section I: PLA News
Exercise: PLA Sends Strong Deterrence Signals with Latest Drill Around Taiwan
In early April, the PLA Eastern Theater Command carried out a high-profile joint exercise around Taiwan codenamed “Strait Thunder-2025A.” The operation involved warships, fighter jets, and long-range rocket systems and tested key capabilities, including air and maritime blockade, precision strikes on critical infrastructure, and joint command across service branches. Notably, the exercise featured multidirectional encirclement of Taiwan and included participation by the Shandong aircraft carrier strike group east of the island. At least six China Coast Guard vessels carried out “law enforcement measures” around the island to simulate a quarantine.
CCA Analysis: What distinguishes this drill is its shift from the blockade posture seen in past exercises like “Joint Sword” to a more overt simulation of amphibious assault and island seizure operations. Chinese analysts describe the transition as moving from “sealing off” to “taking over”—a reflection of the PLA’s growing confidence and aim to choke off Taiwan from key shipping routes. The exercise also incorporated new elements like “comprehensive control of key domains” and emphasized joint operations involving advanced systems such as the J-35 stealth fighter and Dongfeng hypersonic missiles. The integration of the China Coast Guard signals deeper naval–law enforcement coordination.
This drill further normalizes high-intensity PLA activities around Taiwan, blurring the line between deterrence and preparation for actual combat. Analysts suggest it is not merely a response to Taiwan’s political moves but a calculated demonstration of capability directed at both Taipei and Washington. The absence of a codename on the first day and its sudden announcement are perhaps a signal of heightened readiness and strategic unpredictability.
Strategically, “Strait Thunder-2025A” could test U.S. red lines by showcasing China’s ability to cut off Taiwan’s critical supply routes and deter external intervention. In parallel, it serves as a potent bargaining chip amid rising U.S.-China tensions and ongoing trade disputes. Beijing’s show of force underscores that PLA readiness against Taiwan is now a central tool in its broader competition with the United States.
Learn more: Taiwan Policy Database
Expansion: PLA Navy’s Second Overseas Base Launches in Cambodia
On April 5, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers jointly inaugurated Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, which was renovated and expanded in recent years with Chinese funding. The announcement formally opens China’s second military base abroad.1 The project adds a China‑Cambodia joint logistics and training center and a 650‑meter pier able to berth aircraft carrier–sized vessels—hardware that Cambodia itself does not operate. Ream represents China’s second official overseas military base, following the establishment of a base in Djibouti in August 2017.
Beijing said the complex will support counterterrorism as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster‑relief missions and “does not target any third party.” The annual “Golden Dragon‑2025” China-Cambodia bilateral exercise began at the site following the ribbon-cutting ceremony. Phnom Penh later confirmed a goodwill visit by two Japan Maritime Self‑Defense Force ships on April 19—the first foreign port call at the upgraded base.2
CCA Analysis: The PLA is quick to dispel concerns over China’s regional intentions, framing Ream as a “new model” of joint use that differs from its base in Djibouti. Chinese military analyst Zhang Junshe [张军社] argues that the shared‑operation scheme allows China to provide “public goods” that will “contribute to regional peace, stability, and development.”3
Strategically, the base expands China’s reach into the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean without transiting chokepoints controlled by Vietnam, Singapore, or Indonesia. Beijing hopes that the base will “de‑risk supply chains” at a time when U.S. tariffs and tightening export controls threaten congestion along established routes. Ream also gives the PLA direct access to contingencies in the South China Sea.
Some PLA observers suggest the refurbished base could support the delayed, China‑backed Funan Techo Canal, an inland waterway designed to reduce Cambodia’s reliance on Vietnamese ports.
PLA expert Shao Yongling calls overseas support hubs a “top priority” for the PLA Navy’s blue-water ambitions, saying, “A navy can’t stay at sea forever; ships need a home port.” She notes that China’s amphibious assault ships, aircraft carriers, and Type‑055 destroyers now demand regular overseas maintenance. Ream, she argues, offers an “exploratory model” of joint development that respects host-country sovereignty. Both Shao and Zhang hint that more such centers will follow in the coming years.
Learn more: Jie Gao, “Re-Engaging With the World: China's Military Diplomacy in 2023”
Corruption: He Weidong’s Downfall and Cracks in Xi’s Fujian Military Network
On April 10, the Financial Times reported that Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong (何卫东) had been arrested.4 The article cited five people familiar with the situation, including current and former U.S. officials, which suggests it may be authoritative.
If confirmed, He’ removal as the PLA’s second-ranked officer and third in command would prove one of the largest shakeups in decades. A member of the CCP Politburo, he previously commanded the Eastern Theater Command (ETC), acting as a key military planner of PLA contingencies for Taiwan as well as for potential conflicts with Japan and the United States in the East China Sea. While no longer commander by August 2022, reports indicated that he may have played a role in planning the PLA’s unprecedented military drills and missile launches near Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit.
He’s dismissal comes six months after Xi Jinping suspended Miao Hua, another Central Military Commission member, for “serious violations of discipline”—a euphemism for corruption.
CCA Analysis: He’s apparent downfall is one of the most consequential developments in Party-PLA relations in recent memory and will have reverberations for years to come.
He’s and Miao’s careers overlapped many times. Both served in the 31st (now 73rd) Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, where they established close ties with Xi during his tenure as deputy secretary and governor. They became Xi’s most trusted troops in the PLA and were not only “comrades-in-arms” but close confidants. With their downfall, Xi appears to be targeting the “Fujian clique.”
Given his command of the ETC, He was likely one of Xi’s most important advisors on a Taiwan contingency. What impact his removal will have on the PLA’s planning remains to be seen. At minimum, Xi has lost a trusted advisor; at worst, He’s removal will increase Xi’s doubts that the PLA can execute an invasion of Taiwan in the near term.
Learn more: Lyle Morris, “What China’s New Military Leadership Line-Up Says About Xi’s Plans For Taiwan”
Section II: PLA Strategy
“Two Polishes” and “Rectification” in Party-PLA Relations
In April and May, the PLA Daily published a series of op-eds under the theme of “deepening political rectification (持续深化政治整训),” authored by personnel from the People’s Armed Policy Force (PAPF), Air Force Engineering University (AFEU) and Hainan Provincial Military District.5 These articles call for greater “ideological unity (统一思想)” at a “critical historical juncture (重大历史关头).” Topics included the “two polishes,” a slogan urging stricter adherence to Party discipline; and recent “rectification” campaigns designed to improve political work across the force.
Liang Jinxiao of the First Mobile Corps of the PAPF authored the first essay of this series titled “Adhere to Strengthening the Foundation and Strengthening Ideological Transformation.”6 At the outset of the article, he put forward the slogan: “polish the weapons in our hands and kill more enemies on the battlefield; polish the ideological weapons and set off a wave of theoretical learning” (擦亮手中武器，在战场上多杀敌人；擦亮思想武器，掀起理论学习的热潮). According to Liang, the two polishes, especially the ideological dimension, were institutionalized at the Seventh National Congress in 1945 and continue to inspire political training in the PLA. He stressed that political training remains “a unique advantage and important magic weapon for our army,” and that at every major historical juncture, “our Party uses political training to enable the people’s army to unify its thoughts, correct its direction, and straighten its ranks while marching.”
Another commentary, “Correct Discipline and Strict Rules to Improve Work Style” by Qiu Xinsong of the Political Science Academy of the National Defense University, focused on the “rectification” (整风) of the PLA’s work to combat “peace malpractices” (和平积弊).7 Qiu offered a candid exposition of the flaws in PLA Party-building and ideological “laziness,” saying that even though progress has been made, the “possibility, stubbornness, and danger of bad work styles resurfacing still exists.”
CCA Analysis: These two commentaries assess that more work is necessary within the PLA to ensure it can build discipline and break through ideological bottlenecks preventing it from executing Xi’s directive to “fight and win” battles. The focus on idleness, waste, and unhealthy trends in Party discipline suggests that senior command officers and lower-level troops alike are not meeting training demands. References to a “peace disease” continue to crop up in PLA strategy and doctrinal writings. While political indoctrination is held up as the “secret weapon,” PLA authors continue to suggest that it remains a work in progress. When coupled with a raft of purges, the Party seems to be doubling down on rectification as a means of instilling discipline—and fear—within the PLA’s ranks to adhere more closely to Party demands, or face stiffer consequences.
Section III: PLA Modernization
Challenges in PLA’s Defense Product Traceability Management
Two PLA-affiliated authors exposed critical weaknesses in China’s traceability management systems for military products, highlighting persistent gaps in quality control that could undermine the PLA’s ambitious modernization efforts and combat readiness.
In their article, “An Analysis of the Supervision of Traceability Management for Defense Products,” Wu Caijian and Zeng Aimin from the PLA’s 93147 Unit in Chengdu offer a technical yet critical examination of China’s defense industrial base.8 They lay out four major issues and advocate for a transition from manual and fragmented processes to more systematic, automated, and integrated quality management practices.
Among the identified challenges was non-standardized product and process identification. For instance, aviation components were marked using ink that failed to withstand corrosive environments, leading to erasure and complicating quality tracking. Another case involved laser engraving on high-precision parts, where the process itself caused micro-cracks and compromised the parts’ integrity.
A second challenge lies in poor data recording. Wu and Zeng describe systemic weaknesses in dispersed data storage across departments, poor accounting of test records, and a general lack of experience and awareness regarding traceability among civilian contractors. A particularly striking example involved a turbine blade failure in which no record of a critical design dimension was available for post-incident review.
Third, they highlight a lack of system-level integration and planning. Although policies formally require traceability, in practice, many civilian defense firms fail to treat it as a core aspect of technical management. The authors describe cases where QR codes were designed for products without the necessary infrastructure, such as scanners or software. Moreover, production documents like routing cards and inspection sheets often lack standardized fields for key data, making quality investigations difficult and unreliable.
Finally, the authors note that China’s traceability management tools have not kept pace with the demands of modern military hardware. Traceability is fundamental to quality assurance, requiring detailed records across procurement, manufacturing, maintenance, and repair. This ensures effective process control and rapid fault tracing when issues arise. However, many production stages—including machine operation logs, inspection results, and environmental monitoring—still rely on manual data entry and paper records, making the process vulnerable to human error and inefficiencies. Without modern, automated systems to collect, store, and analyze traceability data, civilian defense manufacturers struggle to maintain the high standards needed for the PLA’s increasingly complex military equipment.
CCA Analysis: The article offers a rare and telling window into systemic flaws within China’s defense manufacturing traceability systems and spotlights deeper risks to the PLA’s modernization due to quality assurance.
This is particularly significant given the broader context of corruption and quality control scandals within the PLA. In recent years, several senior officials from defense manufacturers have been investigated for corruption charges.9 This extensive purge has raised suspicions of substandard components and lax enforcement of technical standards in military products, risking the reliability and safety of PLA platforms. Two J-15 accidents in April 2016 caused by flight control malfunctions during takeoff, one of which resulted in the death of the pilot, vividly underscore these risks.10
While the PLA continues the ambitious expansion of its capabilities, these cases serve as a reminder that without robust institutional safeguards and transparent quality control, new capacities remain vulnerable to underlying weaknesses, undermining both combat readiness and the credibility of China’s defense modernization.
Section IV: PLA Research Highlights
Title: A Review of Intelligent Generation of Combat Simulation Scenarios [作战仿真想定智能化生成研究综述]
Authors: DONG Zhiming [董志明]1, HU Zhongqi [胡忠奇] 1,2, LIU Zhaoyang [刘赵阳]3, and ZHOU Heyang [周贺阳]1
Affiliation: 1. Army Armored Forces Academy [陆军装甲兵学院], Beijing; People’s Liberation Army Unit 31689 [解放军31689部队], Taonan, Jilin; 3. People’s Liberation Army Unit 32292 [解放军32292部队], Mudanjiang, Heilongjiang
Publisher: Journal of System Simulation [系统仿真学报]
Abstract: Currently, the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios has become an urgent need to improve the efficiency of warfare simulation. In recent years, large language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in tasks such as semantic understanding, reasoning and question answering, and text generation, offering new methods and pathways for the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios. To provide theoretical insights for research on the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios, this paper systematically reviews the methods based on large language models. It begins by introducing the basic content of warfare simulation scenarios, analyzing the shortcomings of current mainstream scenario generation methods, and discussing how to leverage large language models to address these issues. Next, it outlines the application paradigms and key supporting technologies for the intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios based on large language models. Finally, it looks ahead to the research prospects of intelligent generation of warfare simulation scenarios, considering both the trends in large language models and the demands of warfare simulation.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: Requirement Analysis of Urban Underground Capture and Control Combat Capability Based on GQFD [基于 GQFD 的城市地下夺控作战能力需求分析]
Authors: FENG Xuanming¹ ² [冯轩铭], ZHAO Gang¹ [赵刚], ZHANG Long¹ [张龙], LEI Zhen¹ [雷震], and YANG Bo¹ [杨波]
Affiliation: 1. Academy of System Engineering, Academy of Military Sciences, People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军军事科学院系统工程研究院], Beijing; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 32178 [中国人民解放军32178部队], Beijing.
Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]
Abstract: In response to the increasing importance of underground space operations in future urban warfare, to address the current issues of insufficient research on underground space operations and unclear capability requirements, a Grey Quality Function Deployment (GQFD) method based on grey correlation analysis is adopted. After fully studying and analyzing the concept of urban underground seizure and control operations and the basic “task-capability” requirements, a grey correlation analysis and a House of Quality demand model are established. Through analysis and calculation, the key capability requirement indicators and their importance ranking for urban underground seizure and control operations are obtained, providing a certain basis for the research on urban underground warfare and the demonstration and construction of equipment requirements.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: Analysis and Reflection on the Operational Training of the U.S. Space Force [美国太空军实战化训练分析与思考]
Authors: XIE Wenjie [谢文杰], LIU Yongli [刘永利], ZHAO Yali [赵亚利], and WANG Xia [王霞]
Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63611 [中国人民解放军63611部队], Korla, Xinjiang
Publisher: Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术]
Abstract: Operational training is the fundamental way to generate and enhance combat effectiveness, serving as the most direct preparation for military conflict. To strengthen space warfare readiness, the U.S. Space Force is focusing closely on operational training, clearly requiring its troops to develop space operation mindset, master space operation knowledge and skills, and test space doctrines and tactics. Guided by this, the U.S. Space Force restructures and builds training institutions rapidly, studies and uses digital technology deeply, optimizes and improves effective tactics continuously, cultivates and solidifies combat-focused culture actively, striving to deliver an innovative, professional and world-class joint combat force. Analyzing the training measures and characteristics of the U.S. Space Force, the suggestions are provided by thinking deeply about how to strengthen space force training and develop space deterrence and confrontation capabilities rapidly, in the aspects of training innovation, training close to combat, and condition construction.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: A Novel Mode of Commander Training for Joint Operation Command Teaching [面向联合作战指挥教学的指挥员训练新模式]
Authors: GE Chenglong [葛承垄], WANG Bing [王冰], and JIA Chenxing [贾晨星]
Affiliation: College of Joint Operations, National Defense University [国防大学联合作战学院], Shijiazhuang, Hebei
Publisher: Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真]
Abstract: Aiming at the typical training demands of commander training for joint operations teaching in military academies, such as mass joint operations knowledge inquiry, battle case traceability and re-pushing, combat scene cognition and blue army confrontation, four novel commander training modes are put forward from the perspective of top-level design which are the theoretical teaching oriented commander training mode with question answering, battle case study oriented commander training mode with extension, scenario teaching oriented commander training mode with cognition and countermeasure training oriented commander training mode with confrontation. Then the essential technologies such as military knowledge intelligent answering based on large language model, parallel battlefield and situational cognition, construction and analysis of military event evolutionary graph and blue army behavior tree modeling integrating online learning are analyzed in detail which support the four novel training modes. This study can provide methodological support and implementation reference for military academies to carry out commander training with certain characteristics of digital-intelligence integration.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Section V: PLA Observers
Lucie Beraud Sudreau, Meia Nouwens, and Veerle Nouwens, “China’s Military Aid: A Growing Trend Under Xi Jinping’s First Decade in Power,” Economics of Peace and Security Journal 20, no. 1 (2025): 22–41, https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.20.1.22.
Conor Kennedy, “Behind the Fleet: The PLAN Reviews Logistics Development in the 13th Five-Year Plan,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/behind-the-fleet-the-plan-reviews-logistics-development-in-the-13th-five-year-plan.
Jackson Smith and Cristina Garafola, “PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-perceptions-of-and-reactions-to-u-s-military-activities-in-low-earth-orbit.
Tai-yuan Yang and K. Tristan Tang, “‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 7, April 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/strait-thunder-2025a-drill-implies-future-increase-in-pla-pressure-on-taiwan.
Caroline Y. Tirk and Eli B. Tirk, “PLA Information Support to the Battlefield: UAV Employment Concepts and Challenges,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 14, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147737/pla-information-support-to-the-battlefield-uav-employment-concepts-and-challeng.
Joel Wuthnow, “A New Step in China’s Military Reform,” Joint Force Quarterly 117 (2025): 4–13, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol117/iss2/3.
John Chen and Emilie B. Stewart, “PLA Concepts of UAV Swarms and Manned/Unmanned Teaming,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 21, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147751/pla-concepts-of-uav-swarms-and-mannedunmanned-teaming.
Ryan D. Martinson, “China Maritime Report No. 46: China’s Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia,” China Maritime Studies Institute, April 23, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/46.
Jake Rinaldi, “Waging War Without Disruption: China’s People’s Armed Police in a Future Conflict,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 24, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict.
Josh Baughman, “The People’s Liberation Army at the Nexus of Mind and Technology to Shape the Cognitive Battlefield,” in Human, Machine, War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2025), 223–40, http://media.defense.gov/2025/Apr/18/2003694020/-1/-1/1/B-188%20HMW%20FINAL%204.8.25%20-%20WITH%20508%20CHECK.PDF.
Mina Marcus, “China’s Conceptual Approaches to Counter-UAS and Lessons Drawn from Recent Conflicts,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, April 28, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147766/chinas-conceptual-approaches-to-counter-uas-and-lessons-drawn-from-recent-confl.
Maud Descamps, Jingdong Yuan, and Yifei Zhu, “Military-Civil Fusion Is a Key Chinese Strategy with Long-Term Implications: An Interview with Jingdong Yuan and Yifei Zhu,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 29, 2025, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/military-civil-fusion-is-a-key-chinese-strategy-with-long-term-implications.
“中柬云壤港联合保障和训练中心挂牌运行” [China-Cambodia Ream Port Joint Support and Training Center Officially Launched], 81.cn, April 5, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16379019.html.
Agence France-Presse, “Cambodia’s China-renovated naval base has ‘nothing to hide’, Hun Manet says,” SCMP, April 5, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3305348/cambodias-renovated-naval-base-has-nothing-hide-manet-says?module=perpetual_scroll_1_RM&pgtype=article.
BAI Bo, “中国海军走向“深蓝”需要海外基地” [Chinese Navy Needs More Overseas Bases to Become A ‘Deep-Water’ Navy], Beijing Daily [北京日报], April 11, 2025, https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2025-04-11/doc-inestrkm2999181.shtml?froms=ggmp.
Demetri Sevastopulo, “Top Chinese general removed in Xi Jinping’s latest purge,” Financial Times, April 10, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/8226e1d9-2e4a-4079-8f3c-2ae877ba5ba9.
ZHANG Jun [张钧], “持续推动政治整训走深走实” [Continue to advance political rectification in a deeper and more practical manner], 81.cn, April 22, 2025, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16382536.html; CHEN Jundong [陈军栋], “坚持聚力攻坚 助力强军打赢” [Remain committed to concentrated efforts to tackle tough challenges and contribute to building a strong military capable of winning wars], 81.cn, April 30, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16383602.html; ZHANG Xinrui [张炘瑞] and LIAO Yirong [廖一嵘], “坚持问题导向 全面纠偏正向” [Adhere to a problem-oriented approach and comprehensively correct deviations and guide toward the right direction], 81.cn, May 3, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16383961.html; XIN Xin [辛鑫], “坚持实事求是 弘扬优良传统” [Uphold the principle of seeking truth from facts and carry forward fine traditions], 81.cn, May 7, 2025, http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/tsysb_207739/qjxjc/16384908.html; WANG Bijun [王碧君], “坚持以上率下 发挥“头雁效应”” [Lead by example and give full play to the ‘lead goose effect], 81.cn, May 12, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16385476.html.
LIANG Jinxiao [梁金霄], “坚持固本培元 强化思想改造” [Uphold fundamental values and strengthen ideological transformation], 81.cn, April 28, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-04-28&paperNumber=06&articleid=954068.
QIU Xinsong [邱新松], “正纲纪 严规矩 砺作风” [Correct Discipline and Strict Rules to Improve Work Style], 81.cn, April 25, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-04-25&paperNumber=07&articleid=953925.
WU Caijian [吴才健] and ZENG Aimin [曾爱民], “An Analysis of the Supervision of Traceability Management for Defense Products” [军工产品可追溯性管理监督浅析], Electromechanical Components [机电元件], Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2025, https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1000-6133.2025.02.016.
For example, China South Industries Group Corporation, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation have all had officials investigated. See Zou Xiaotong, “‘靠军工吃军工’中航工业原董事长谭瑞松被开除党籍” [“Depending on Military Industry for a Living,” Former AVIC Chairman Tan Ruisong Was Expelled from the Party], Caixin, February 24, 2025, https://companies.caixin.com/2025-02-24/102291496.html?originReferrer=caixinsearch_pc; and https://www.caixin.com/2025-02-12/102287585.html; and Luo Guoping, “中国兵装集团副总刘卫东被查 辉煌时35岁出任东风集团副总” [Liu Weidong, Vice President of China North Industries Group Corporation, Was Investigated; He Was 35 Years Old When He Was the Vice President of Dongfeng Group], Caixin, February 12, 2025, https://www.caixin.com/2025-02-12/102287585.html.
“央视披露歼15舰载机故障 刚起飞300米飞机就往下掉” [CCTV Revealed That the J-15 Carrier-Based Aircraft Had a Malfunction and the Aircraft Fell 300 Meters After Taking Off], Guancha.cn, October 16, 2017, https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_10_16_431048.shtml.