PLA Watch #1: Jan 2025
From Center for China Analysis: Newsletter on China's Military Activities
Welcome to the first edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest Chinese military affairs and writings. PLA Watch fills a gap in the China-watching community by providing updates and analysis of the activities, strategies, and advancements of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as well as its capabilities and intentions, using primary Chinese-language sources.
PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.
This issue covers the meeting of the recently expanded Discipline Inspection Commission under the Central Military Commission (CMC) in the context of Xi Jinping’s ongoing anticorruption campaign, the 46th Fleet of the PLA Navy’s expanded global engagements, new measures to curb military information leaks, PLA views on artificial general intelligence (AGI) and deterrence, and recent PLA research on integrated joint fires, directed-energy weapons, and space warfare.
Written by:
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis
Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis
With support from:
Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis
Ian Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis
Section I: PLA News
Discipline: CMC Meeting, Visits, and Accountability Guidelines
Top PLA leaders have intensified anticorruption efforts and emphasized combat readiness, reinforcing Beijing’s push for political loyalty and military effectiveness ahead of the PLA’s 2027 centennial. On January 10, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong led an expanded meeting of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, calling for stricter oversight and enforcement.1 In particular, He called for “deepening interdepartmental, cross-sector, and civil-military coordinated governance and joint management” regarding the PLA’s anticorruption campaign. This meeting followed the January 5 release of the “Guidelines on Precise and Standardized Accountability,”2 which further institutionalizes the crackdown by detailing specific violations warranting disciplinary action, with a focus on CCP leadership, political discipline, and military preparedness failures.
Simultaneously, combat readiness remains a top priority. During separate pre–Lunar New Year inspections, He and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia visited PLA units in Shenyang and Beijing, urging political discipline, high-intensity training, and force cohesion.3 Zhang’s visit to the Information Support Force stressed political rectification, while He’s trip to PLA Air Force units reinforced the importance of round-the-clock combat preparedness.
CCA Analysis: By codifying disciplinary enforcement and linking governance to operational effectiveness, the CCP continues to double down on efforts to ensure a politically reliable and combat-ready force. These developments signal both the CCP’s effort to institutionalize anticorruption measures within the PLA as well as a concern that the PLA is not heeding Xi Jinping’s warnings about reducing corruption and the mismanagement of funds related to equipment procurement. Corruption will remain Xi’s primary fixation amid calls to build a modern, technically proficient military capable of “fighting and winning battles.”
Diplomacy: The PLA Navy’s Expanded Global Engagement
The 46th Fleet of the PLA Navy returned to Zhanjiang on January 24, 2025, after a 339-day mission, one of the longest deployments in recent history.4 The fleet, comprising guided-missile destroyer Jiaozuo, missile frigate Xuchang, and replenishment vessel Honghu, traveled over 160,000 nautical miles—far surpassing the 90,000-nautical-mile average of fleets since 2022. During its mission, the fleet conducted escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, engaged in military diplomacy, and participated in a multilateral exercise in Nigeria, Russia’s Navy Day celebrations, and an international naval festival in South Africa. The fleet also visited Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles.
CCA Analysis: The resurgence of port visits and joint exercises signals a post-pandemic recovery in naval diplomacy, enabling the PLA Navy to rebuild and expand its diplomatic and security engagements on a global scale. It also highlights the PLA Navy’s logistical constraints. With only nine Type 903/903A auxiliary oiler replenishment vessels in service, it must balance expanding training and manpower requirements for its blue-water capabilities without overly constraining its surface combatants.5 These competing priorities underscore the PLA Navy’s structural limitations as it seeks to sustain longer-range naval missions.
Security: The PLA Cracks Down on Military Information Leaks
The Chinese government unveiled sweeping new regulations to limit the unlawful release of PLA-related information online, a move that could restrict key open-source information used to monitor PLA developments.6 The notice, “Administrative Measures for the Dissemination of Military Information on the Internet,” was announced on February 9 by the Office of the National Administration of State Secrets Protection and endorsed by ten CCP agencies. It takes effect on March 1.
The regulations will undoubtedly curb the sharing of images, maps, and information regarding PLA troop movements and assets by Internet users and military bloggers both in China and around the globe.
Relatedly, the PLA Daily published two rare articles on regulating military-related information on the Internet, emphasizing the need for stricter oversight to prevent the spread of misinformation, speculation, and potential security breaches. One article called for a legal framework to manage the dissemination of military information, warning against unregulated social media accounts that sensationalize military affairs, leak sensitive information, or spread misleading narratives.7 The second article echoed these concerns, emphasizing the dual role of the Internet in shaping public perceptions of the PLA while also posing security risks due to the rise of social media influencers and viral content.8 Both pieces advocated for enhanced military-civilian cooperation in regulating online military discussions.
CCA Analysis: The new regulations will tighten control over military-themed content on the Chinese Internet. Open-source analysis, especially from users in China, has been a valuable source of information for the PLA-watching community. Official sources of information from the PLA and government agencies have been curtailed, increasing the need for alternatives. For example, last December, online footage and images of what many believed to be China’s next-generation stealth fighter jet flying in broad daylight over two Chinese cities caused a stir in both China and overseas. With no formal acknowledgment from the Ministry of National Defense, images shared on online platforms such as X became one of the only sources of information about the test flight.
It is unclear how the new rules will affect foreign media reporting on the Chinese military.
The PLA Daily articles coincided with the United States’ temporary ban of TikTok, which triggered a migration of users (i.e., “TikTok refugees”) to alternative Chinese platforms such as RedNote. Some Chinese netizens on these platforms warned against inadvertently sharing sensitive information with foreigners. The heightened concerns about online military discussions in the PLA Daily may reflect broader anxieties over increased international exposure and the potential risks posed by foreign users engaging with China-based social media.
Section II: PLA Strategy
Observations on the United States’ Nuclear Deterrence Strategy
Ge Hanwen, a professor at the National University of Defense Technology, published “From Cold War to Great-Power Competition: The U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence” in Global Review, a journal edited by the Shanghai Institute for International Studies.9 Ge explores the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy from the Cold War to the contemporary era of great-power competition and argues that the United States has not fundamentally changed its approach despite shifts in global power dynamics.
The article highlights key historical lessons from the Cold War from China’s perspective. These include an analysis of U.S. willingness to consider nuclear use after achieving a “nuclear monopoly,” how nuclear weapons became a tool of deterrence rather than coercion, and how nuclear threats were largely ineffective in deterring regional conflicts. Ge asserts that the United States continues to leverage its nuclear advantage, using arms control to limit China’s nuclear development rather than genuinely seeking strategic stability.10 He argues that U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons is deepening as part of a broader strategy to win the great-power competition. Ge contends that by integrating nuclear and conventional deterrence, maintaining a flexible nuclear posture, and advancing missile defense systems to undermine potential adversaries’ second-strike capabilities, the United States is mirroring Cold War–era policies and failing to acknowledge the risks of a new nuclear arms race.
For China, the implications are significant. Ge suggests that U.S. nuclear strategy, particularly its emphasis on integrated deterrence, pressures China into strengthening its nuclear forces to ensure credible retaliation. He warns that Washington’s coercion through nuclear signaling, especially regarding Taiwan, could backfire. Historical precedent, including Mao Zedong’s dismissal of U.S. nuclear threats as a “paper tiger,” suggests that nuclear deterrence alone may be insufficient to alter Beijing’s strategic calculus.
CCA Analysis: The article reflects current Chinese thinking on U.S. nuclear coercion, which frames U.S. nuclear policy as a continuation of Cold War–era reasoning and a catalyst for China’s advancing nuclear capabilities. Ge’s perspective aligns with China’s broader concerns about strategic stability and arms control negotiations, reinforcing the view that nuclear parity is essential to deterring U.S. strategic pressure. He contends that true nuclear stability can only emerge through “mutually assured destruction” rather than continued U.S. efforts to maintain nuclear primacy.
Section III: PLA Modernization
Reflections on AGI and Deterrence
With the announcement of the release of o3 by OpenAI in January, Chinese military analysts have intensified their discussions of artificial general intelligence (AGI)’s role in deterrence. A recent PLA Daily article questions whether AGI can serve as the “ultimate deterrent.”11 The authors argue that deterrence, at its core, relies on human judgment—an element absent in AGI. They highlight that AGI’s speed, lack of empathy, and rigid decision-making could decrease the space for strategic bargaining and increase the risk of unintended escalation. The article warns that AGI-controlled autonomous weapons might miscalculate threats, raising concerns about crisis stability. It also cites a Cornell University study where AI wargaming models escalated conflicts to nuclear use even when programmed to act neutrally, underscoring the risks of entrusting AGI with deterrence decisions.
Despite these concerns, other PLA-affiliated researchers take a more optimistic view, arguing that AI is reshaping deterrence dynamics in a positive way.12 Their analysis, borrowing from Western deterrence scholars like Alex Wilner, Jessica Cox, and Heather Williams,13 suggests that AI can enhance deterrence by improving perception, signal transmission, and decision-making speed. They see AI as a stabilizing force that can compensate for the shortcomings of traditional deterrence methods, particularly when dealing with diverse adversaries. AI’s ability to generate deterrence signals, they argue, could be crucial for an “integrated deterrence” framework. However, they also acknowledge AI’s inherent risks, highlighting the opacity of machine learning models and how AI-driven deterrence might create “evaluation dilemmas” where adversaries struggle to assess each other’s true capabilities. AI-enhanced weapons could lead to crisis instability, they find, by favoring preemptive action over restraint. This aligns with Wilner’s concerns that AI may introduce unpredictable chain reactions in crisis scenarios. The authors argue that AI-driven deterrence creates the need for new arms control mechanisms and call for integrating AI into existing global arms control frameworks to mitigate escalation risks.
CCA Analysis: AI is arguably the most consequential technological capability in military affairs, with the United States and China investing millions of dollars incorporating AI into war-fighting. While the PLA has actively integrated AI at the tactical and operational levels—enhancing battlefield awareness, decision-making, and autonomous capabilities—these articles suggest an ongoing debate within the PLA about its strategic role in deterrence. Some Chinese scholars argue that AI strengthens deterrence by improving signal transmission and reducing miscalculation, while others caution against its opacity, crisis instability, and the potential for unintended escalation. This divergence in views suggests that while AI is becoming integral to PLA operations, its effectiveness in shaping deterrence remains contested.
Devoted to Training and Combat Readiness in the New Year
The PLA has outlined a comprehensive vision for training and combat readiness, emphasizing foundational training, integrated operations, joint training, and technological innovation. A series of four recent articles by PLA-affiliated scholars offer insights into the implementation of these priorities.
The first article highlights training as the “bedrock of military effectiveness.”14 Recent reports from the PLA Daily mention that some units are struggling with foundational training due to compressed schedules and inconsistent execution, leading to skill gaps and suboptimal performance.15 To address this, the authors advocate for leveraging big data, cloud computing, and intelligent training methods to design scientifically optimized training programs and AI-powered personalized training recommendations.
The second article examines integrated training, unit cohesion, cross-domain interoperability, and digital simulations for enhanced coordination.16
The third article highlights joint training as central to modern combat, emphasizing command improvements, inter-service cooperation, and the integration of cyber and electronic warfare.17
The final article explores technology-driven training transformation, advocating for AI, virtual reality, and autonomous systems to enhance realism and effectiveness.18
CCA Analysis: A common theme across these discussions is the PLA’s push to integrate AI-driven decision-making, virtual reality simulations, and autonomous platforms into its training. PLA training repeatedly emphasizes technological integration and realistic training environments as a means to compensate for its limited military experience. These efforts indicate the PLA’s shift toward a tech-enabled training model that simulates real-world combat scenarios. However, no amount of simulation can fully recreate the realities of the battlefield. Nevertheless, this has not stopped the PLA from devoting significant attention to trying to create realistic training scenarios.
Section IV: PLA Research Highlights
Title: Thinking About Predicting and Resolving Combat Fire Conflicts Between Foreign Directed-Energy Weapons and Short- and Medium-Range Air-Defense Weapons [国外定向能武器与中近程防空武器协同作战火力冲突预判及消解思考]
Authors: Li Ye [李烨], Teng Zhe [滕哲], Wang Liang [王亮], Sun Haiwen [孙海文], Gu Xiaodong [顾晓东], and Lu Fengbo [陆凤波]
Affiliation: Naval Research Academy, Beijing, China; Dalian Naval Academy, Dalian, China
Publisher: Acta Armamentarii [兵工学报]
Abstract: The future of air-defense operations is becoming increasingly complex, with the integration of directed-energy weapons (DEWs) and short- and medium-range air-defense weapons by the United States and Russia posing unprecedented fire conflict risks for single-platform air operations. This paper focuses on the prediction and resolution of fire conflicts in cooperative combat involving DEWs and traditional, kinetic-energy air-defense systems. Using the CHAMP high-power microwave weapon (CHAMP HPMW), the RAM short-range air-defense missile, the Standard-2 medium-range air-defense missile, and the Phalanx close-in weapon system as case studies, the authors construct ballistic models for both DEWs and conventional air-defense systems, analyze fire conflict criteria, and design resolution principles. A full-process ballistic modeling and simulation is conducted to validate these resolution strategies, aiming to provide innovative methods for mitigating fire conflicts between directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons.
Title: Research on the Application of Space-Based Information Support in Ultra-Long-Range Air-Defense Operations [天基信息支援在超远程防空作战中的应用研究]
Author: Liu Ke [刘科]
Affiliation: The 10th Research Institute, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Chengdu, Sichuan, China
Publisher: Modern Defense Technology [现代防御技术]
Abstract: Ultra-long-range air defense aims to neutralize incoming threats thousands of miles away, necessitating seamless integration of the strike chain, command and control chain, and intelligence chain. This paper examines the role of direct support from space-based information in enhancing these operational chains. It first dissects the key processes of each chain, then introduces a space-based direct support model, exploring its applications in ultra-long-range air defense. The study further investigates how space-based intelligence enhances situational awareness, precision targeting, and information fusion to improve the effectiveness of future air defense systems. The findings provide insights for the development of advanced air defense information support frameworks.
Title: Design and Construction of a Large-Scale Model in the Field of Command and Decision-Making [指挥决策大模型的设计与构建思路]
Authors: Zhao Luda [赵禄达], Wang Bin [王斌], Liu Chunsheng [刘春生], Kang Linshuang [康林双], Yao Shifeng [姚世锋], and Zhang Yanqiu [张艳秋]
Affiliation: National University of Defense Technology, Hefei, China; Military Representative Bureau of Army Equipment Department, Chongqing, China
Publisher: Journal of Command and Control [指挥与控制学报]
Abstract: In response to the evolving demands for intelligent command and control in warfare, this study explores the application of large-scale models in command decision-making. The research focuses on addressing the challenges of training, optimizing, scheduling, and managing large-scale command decision models, particularly the need for vast datasets for training and fine-tuning them. The study provides design strategies for constructing high-quality data systems, optimizing model training and inference, and refining management approaches. The goal is to enhance intelligent decision support for joint operational command, equipping command decision models with capabilities such as real-time battlefield assessment, interactive readiness support, and heuristic operational planning.
Title: Study on the Law of Armed Conflict in the Military Applications of Commercial Satellites [商业卫星军事应用中的武装冲突法问题研究]
Author: Sun Xinyi [孙心依]
Affiliation: East China University of Political Science And Law
Publisher: Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Social Sciences) [南京航空航天大学学报 (社会科学版)]
Abstract: Since the 1980s, commercial satellites have been widely used in national defense and military fields and have also been closely involved in armed conflicts, bringing strategic and tactical advantages for ground military operations. However, the extensive engagement of commercial satellites in contemporary armed conflicts has also given rise to new legal issues, namely that under the legal framework governing outer space, activities conducted by commercial satellites shall be attributed to the respective sovereign states. Accordingly, their utilization to support armed conflicts involves the application of the law of neutrality as prescribed by the law of armed conflict, as well as the international humanitarian law. However, the absence of targeted application rules has led to the situation in which Western countries seek to extend the boundaries of the rule of neutrality and international humanitarian law to the military application of commercial satellites by offering military aid to warring countries through commercial satellites in practice. It is necessary for the international community to recognize the equal binding force of the law of armed conflict in outer space and provide further practical guidance for private operators of commercial satellites, military departments of belligerent and neutral countries in armed conflicts through the application of soft law and domestic regulation.
Section V: PLA Observers
Timothy A. Walton and Thomas H. Shugart, “Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific,” Hudson Institute, January 7, 2025, https://www.hudson.org/arms-control-nonproliferation/concrete-sky-air-base-hardening-western-pacific-timothy-walton-thomas-shugart.
Brendan S. Mulvaney, “PLA Views on the Information Domain,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, January 13, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4018763/pla-views-on-the-information-domain.
Toshi Yoshihara, Jack Bianchi, and Casey Nicastro, “Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 13, 2025, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/focused-force-chinas-military-challenge-and-australias-response.
Jake Rinaldi and Jake Vartanian, “Rethinking Denial: The People’s Liberation Army’s Laser Systems and the Future Challenges for Hellscape,” Strategic Studies Institute, January 14, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4029077/rethinking-denial-the-peoples-liberation-armys-laser-systems-and-the-future-cha.
Benjamin Jensen, “What China’s New Fighter Jet Really Signals,” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/16/china-new-fighter-jet-military-capabilities.
Lyle Morris, “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States,” Asia Society Policy Institute, January 22, 2025, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-views-escalation-and-crisis-management-and-implications-united-states.
Timothy R. Heath, Howard Wang, and Cindy Zheng, “Political Legitimacy and the People's Liberation Army,” RAND Corporation, January 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2751-1.html.
Christopher H. Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson, “Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng’s Downfall amid Increasing PLAN Readiness,” China Maritime Studies Institute, China Maritime Report, no. 44, January 24, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/44.
Timothy R. Heath, “The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness: The People’s Liberation Army Remains Focused on Upholding Chinese Communist Party Rule, Not Preparing for War,” RAND Corporation, January 27, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA830-1.html.
Mark Cozad and Jennie W. Wenger, “Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military,” RAND Corporation, January 30, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2618-1.html.
Mei Changwei [梅常伟], “何卫东在出席中央军委纪委扩大会议时强调 深入推进全面从严治党全面从严治军 为打好实现建军一百年奋斗目标攻坚战提供坚强保障” [He Weidong Emphasizes at the Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission Expanded Meeting: Deepening Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party and Military to Provide Strong Assurance for Taking Critical Steps to Meet the Centenary Goal of the People’s Liberation Army], Xinhua, January 10, 2025, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250110/043eb2cfd30f4de9a94b4206ec56f33d/c.html.
“中央军委纪律检查委员会（监察委员会）印发《精准规范问责常见情形》” [The Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission (Supervisory Commission) Issues “Guidelines on Precise and Standardized Accountability”], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 6, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16362858.html.
Mei Changwei [梅常伟], “张又侠在信息支援部队某部调研慰问时强调 加强政治引领 深化练兵备战 打好实现建军一百年奋斗目标攻坚战” [Zhang Youxia Emphasizes During an Inspection and Visit to an Information Support Unit: Strengthening Political Guidance, Deepening Military Training and War Preparedness, and Taking Critical Steps to Meet the Centenary Goal of the People’s Liberation Army], Xinhua, January 26, 2025, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250126/c536468c60be4bf0838a7dd4e2b8264e/c.html; and Mei Changwei [梅常伟], “何卫东在驻京部队调研慰问时强调 全力以赴打好实现建军一百年奋斗目标攻坚战 坚决完成党和人民赋予的各项任务” [He Weidong Emphasizes During an Inspection and Visit to Beijing-Based Troops: Going All Out to Take Critical Steps to Meet the Centenary Goal of the People’s Liberation Army and Resolutely Fulfilling the Tasks Entrusted by the Party and the People], Xinhua, January 26, 2025, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250126/e0c5d292c7f14e16870a675f4d4ef5fd/c.html.
“Chinese Navy Fleet Returns from Escort Missions, Joint Exercises,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), January 24, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16366128.html.
Ryan Chan, “Map Shows Chinese Navy Fleet’s 300-Day Mission to Three Continents,” Newsweek, January 27, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-navy-ships-escort-mission-middle-east-asia-africa-europe-2021107.
“关于印发《互联网军事信息传播管理办法》全文及答记者问的通知” [Notice on Issuing the “Administrative Measures for the Dissemination of Military Information on the Internet”], National Administration of State Secrets Protection (PRC), February 9, 2025, https://www.gjbmj.gov.cn/n1/2025/0208/c409099-40415038.html.
Wu Qiong [吴穹], “以法治理念加强互联网军事信息传播管理” [Strengthening the Management of Military Information Dissemination on the Internet with a Rule-of-Law Approach], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 23, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16365794.html.
Teng Han [滕瀚] and Sun Chao [孙超], “推动互联网军事信息在法治轨道有序传播” [Promoting the Orderly Dissemination of Military Information on the Internet Within the Framework of the Rule of Law], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 25, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16366220.html.
Ge Hanwen [葛汉文], “从冷战经验到大国竞争：美国的核战略与核威慑” [From Cold War to Great-Power Competition: The U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence], Global Review 1 (2025): 65–86, https://www.siis.org.cn/updates/cms/cms/202501/13121923kvk5.pdf.
For more on China’s historical view of nuclear deterrence, see Lyle Morris and Rakesh Sood, “Understanding China’s Perceptions and Strategy Toward Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study Approach,” Asia Society Policy Institute, September 5, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/understanding-chinas-perceptions-and-strategy-toward-nuclear-weapons-case-study-approach.
Rong Ming [荣明] and Hu Xiaofeng [胡晓峰], “智能化战争面面观丨AGI带来的战争思考” [Perspectives on Intelligentized Warfare: Reflections on War Brought by AGI], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 21, 2025, http://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16365490.html.
Zhang Huang [张煌] and Du Yanyun [杜雁芸], “军事智能化与人工智能威慑的生成路径” [Military Intelligence and the Generation Path of Artificial Intelligence Deterrence], Foreign Affairs Review 1 (2025): 92–122, https://www.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2025&filename=WJXY202501004&uniplatform=OVERSEA&v=TNTiYdTVTrjwbi0apcZqhYbQ-Knopg51DmXOotK3luXt3LtnKMbIGrRcb4_clCus.
Alex Wilner and Casey Babb, “New Technologies and Deterrence: Artificial Intelligence and Adversarial Behaviour,” In NL Arms Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021), 401–17; and Jessica Cox and Heather Williams, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” Washington Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2021): 69–85.
Liu Shaopeng [刘少鹏] and Meng Yi [孟毅], “全身心投入新年度练兵备战丨打牢实战实训能力基础” [Fully Committing to New Year Training and War Preparedness: Strengthening the Foundation for Real Combat Training], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 8, 2025, http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/tsysb_207739/qjxjc/16363342.html.
He Bin [何斌], Yin Yihao [尹贻浩], and Song Zixun [宋子洵], “第81集团军某旅：多管齐下提升军事训练质效” [A Brigade of the 81st Group Army: Enhancing Military Training Effectiveness Through Multiple Approaches], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 7, 2025, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/lj/16363049.html.
Wang Shuwen [王树文], “长城瞭望丨下大力抓好合成训练创新发展” [Great Wall Outlook: Making Significant Efforts to Innovate and Develop Synthetic Training], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 13, 2025, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16364092.html.
Jia Junting [贾钧廷], “全身心投入新年度练兵备战丨加速提升一体化联合作战能力” [Fully Committing to New Year Training and War Preparedness (III): Accelerating the Improvement of Integrated Joint Operations Capability], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 15, 2025, http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/tsysb_207739/qjxjc/16364518.html.
Yang Huan [杨欢], “全身心投入新年度练兵备战④丨运用科技推进军事训练转型升级” [Fully Committing to New Year Training and War Preparedness (IV): Using Technology to Promote the Transformation and Upgrading of Military Training], People’s Liberation Army Daily, January 20, 2025, http://www.81.cn/zt/2025nzt/2025nxczjy/yw_250324/16365371.html.