PLA Watch #3: Mar 2025
From Center for China Analysis: Newsletter on China’s Military Activities
Welcome to the third edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest Chinese military affairs and writings using primary sources.
PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.
This issue covers U.S.-China defense diplomacy; China’s participation in the Security Belt-2025 joint exercise with Iran and Russia; and new combat drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) near Taiwan. It also analyzes Xi’s speech on PLA modernization efforts within the 14th Five-Year Plan and recent PLA commentary on nuclear stability. The penultimate section features curated papers by Chinese researchers on air and radar technology, followed by analysis from PLA observers on recent PLA activities.
Written by:
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis
Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis
With support from:
Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis
Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis
Section I: PLA News
Diplomacy: U.S.-China Military Leaders Reach Initial Consensus on Dialogue
During his March press conference, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, revealed that the United States and China had “reached some preliminary consensus” on defense relations and that discussions “are advancing as planned.”1 Wu said that “[building] a stable military relationship between China and the United States is in the common interests of both sides” and aligns with the “expectation of the international community.” He added that “the development of China-U.S. military ties should adhere to the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” Wu also called for “enhanced communication and dialogue to properly handle contradictions and differences,” expressing hope that the two militaries “can achieve sound and stable development.”
CCA Analysis: The fact that the two defense departments are communicating just two months into Donald Trump’s presidency is a positive development. The “early consensus” on military-to-military relations suggests that senior officials within the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and China’s Office of International Military Cooperation have discussed defense dialogues at different levels of their respective bureaucracies. Yet fully restoring military communication lines remains contingent on Washington not crossing any of Beijing’s red lines, such as on Taiwan or other sensitive areas.
Learn more: “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States” by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris.
Exercise (1 of 2): China, Iran, and Russia Conduct Joint Naval Exercises
From March 9 to 13, the Chinese, Iranian, and Russian navies conducted Security Belt-2025, a joint exercise near the Iranian port of Chabahar.2
Under the theme of “Creating Peace and Security Together” (共创和平与安全), ten ships conducted joint maritime strikes, damage control, and search and rescue operations featuring special operations teams. China deployed a destroyer and a supply ship. Scenarios included joint counter-terrorism and counter-piracy that tested “tactical command coordination” among commanders and officers. Officers from all three countries conducted ship visits and participated in cultural and sports activities.
CCA Analysis: While the official justification for the exercise was to “strengthen military mutual trust, foster pragmatic maritime cooperation, and strengthen world and regional peace and stability,” the drills punctuate a trend of deepening military relations between Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran to counter the West. Since 2019, China, Iran, and Russia have held five joint maritime exercises, with the most recent featuring a wider range of naval combat capabilities. The trend will continue as long as geopolitical tensions between the United States and the three participating countries persist.
Still, these exercises are more symbolic than practical, especially when compared to the scale of bilateral drills between China and Russia. For example, during Northern/Interaction-2024 last September, they conducted two-stage live drills, including maritime and air escort operations, alert and defense measures, air defense and missile interception, and firepower strikes.3 In contrast, the last China-Iran bilateral naval drill was in 2017.4 Thus, while trilateral military coordination between Beijing, Tehran, and Moscow is increasing, it has yet to reach the levels of bilateral China-Russia defense cooperation.
Learn more: CCA’s China-Russia program Brothers Forever: Unpacking the Conundrum of China-Russia Relations.
Exercise (2 of 2): Eastern Theater Command Drills near Taiwan to “Punish” Lai
In mid-March, the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA conducted joint air and naval combat readiness patrols near Taiwan to “test and improve the combat capabilities of the troops.”5 According to a Ministry of National Defense spokesperson, the operation was a “powerful punishment” (有力惩戒) against “Taiwan independence elements” and a “solemn warning to external interference forces” (对外部干涉势力的严正警告).
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense website noted a large increase in PLA air and naval activity on March 17. This included “59 sorties of PLA aircraft and 9 PLAN ships,” of which 43 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.6
CCA Analysis: The “punishment” came in response to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s March 13 high-level national security meeting, where he introduced a series of new policies to address major national security threats from China, including “threats from infiltration and espionage targeting Taiwan’s military.” In strong rhetoric, President Lai labeled China a “foreign hostile force,” asserting that Taiwan had no choice but to take more proactive measures to protect its interests. The PLA shifted to a much more decisive posture, launching the drills a mere four days after Lai’s speech. This tit-for-tat exchange does not bode well for cross-strait peace and stability.
Learn more: CCA’s Taiwan Policy Database interactive website.
Section II: PLA Strategy
In early March, four civilian PLA scholars were interviewed by World Military Network—a widely circulated online forum dedicated to military affairs—on how close the world is to nuclear war.7 Among them, Luo Xi (罗曦), associate researcher at the Institute of War Studies at the Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院战争研究院副研究员), provided illuminating commentary on PLA thinking regarding nuclear deterrence. She said that “the threshold for using nuclear weapons is lowering” and that “the boundaries of nuclear war are becoming increasingly blurred.” Luo expounded on this, arguing that the preconditions set by major powers to use nuclear weapons “are being relaxed” and that the scope of using nuclear weapons to deter and retaliate against non-nuclear attacks is “constantly expanding.”
Luo referenced examples such as “large-scale drones flying into [a] country” in scenarios “where nuclear retaliation can be considered”—a reference to Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in response to Ukraine’s drone strikes. She also highlighted Russian threats of tactical nuclear weapons as a novel tactic for nuclear threats against regional non-nuclear actors. Additionally, she noted the United States’ recent doctrinal imperative to counter two nuclear powers simultaneously, which she says “was unthinkable more than a decade ago.” Lumping the United States and Russia together, Luo asserted that “nuclear powers should have assumed the moral responsibility of actively reducing the risk of nuclear conflict”; but when nuclear powers have “made their ideas about nuclear war very concrete,” including “constantly conducting nuclear combat exercises and tactical nuclear weapons exercises with very obvious directions,” such trends will “not have a positive signaling effect on other nuclear-weapon states, but will invariably stimulate a stronger sense of nuclear competition.”
Luo concluded by assessing that the “risk of a large-scale nuclear war is not great in the foreseeable future” and that future wars will “still be more regional conventional wars or conflicts under the background of nuclear deterrence.”
CCA Analysis: Luo’s insights bespeak a general unease with recent Russian nuclear coercion against non-nuclear states like Ukraine, a rarity among PLA scholars. Her assessment that increasing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons injects instability into nuclear dynamics is not new—the PLA has been critical of the U.S. regional nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific for decades. Yet for Luo to highlight Russia and the United States’ propensity to threaten non-nuclear states with nuclear coercion vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine represents a veiled critique of Russia’s role in destabilizing the nuclear architecture.
Learn more: “Understanding China's Perceptions and Strategy Toward Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study Approach” by CCA Senior Fellow Lyle Morris.
Section III: PLA Modernization
On March 7, Xi Jinping presided over a plenary meeting with a delegation of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police during the conclusion of the 14th National People’s Congress.8 During the meeting, Xi endorsed the PLA’s ongoing modernization efforts tied to the 14th Five-Year Plan and called on the PLA to continue implementing “high-quality development” (高质量发展).
Xi stated that “over the past four years since the implementation of the plan, a series of significant achievements have been made” but also mentioned that “many challenges and issues need to be addressed.” Most of the speech was devoted to the importance of incorporating modern technology and innovative management systems to accelerate military modernization. For instance, Xi called on the need to develop “modern management concepts and methods” (现代管理理念和方法手段) in a more “systematic, holistic, and coordinated manner.” He urged greater efforts to leverage the “strengths and resources” of civilian sectors to enhance the quality and efficiency of military development and also called for the establishment of a sound and effective oversight system to thoroughly investigate and address corruption, with a focus on placing “supervision” in a more prominent position.
Two phrases were particularly noteworthy. Two phrases were particularly noteworthy. First, Xi emphasized the need to more quickly solve blockages and obstructions (堵点卡点) in the plan’s implementation and strengthen cross-departmental, cross-field, and cross-military coordination. Second, he pointed out that the completion of the military objectives “cannot be separated from the support of the national economic and social development system.”
CCA Analysis: Reading between the lines, Xi’s remarks are an admission that the PLA is encountering difficulties in adapting China’s vast civilian and military science and technology infrastructure into operational military platforms. This is unsurprising, given that over the past several years, several senior state-enterprise executives involved in arms procurement, along with engineers and scientists, have been arrested for corruption. These include Liu Shiquan, chair of weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group; Wu Yansheng, chair of China Aerospace Science; and Wang Changqing, executive at China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Further, Hu Wenming, a former chairman of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, who oversaw the country’s aircraft carrier development program, was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment on corruption charges; and Xiao Longxu, former chief engineer of the rocket force’s top research institute and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, was removed as a representative of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Similar to the shake-up in military ranks, a widespread crackdown on senior leaders within China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) responsible for weapons manufacturing and research suggests major issues in China’s spending and procurement process. China’s defense SOEs are integrally linked with the PLA’s overall modernization goals. Upheaval indicates that funds were mismanaged for two of Xi’s most prized military investments: aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. If there was a major misuse of funds within the military procurement system, it may have an effect on weapons systems development cycles and their integration within the PLA.
Learn more: “Xi Jinping’s Purges Have Escalated. Here’s Why They Are Unlikely to Stop” by CCA Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu.
Section IV: PLA Research Highlights
Title: Research on Complex Electromagnetic Environment Adaptation Test for Radar Countermeasure Equipment [雷达对抗装备电磁环境适应性试验研究]
Authors: TIAN Miaomiao [田苗苗], PENG Xianjin [彭进先], ZHAO Chao [赵超], GENG Dan [耿丹], YI Tuoyuan [易拓源], and HAN Chunyong [韩春永]
Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63611 [解放军63611部队], Korla, Xinjiang
Publisher: Modern Defence Technology [现代防御技术]
Abstract: Complex electromagnetic environment adaptation test is an important reference for the equipment operation application. In view of the requirements of the electromagnetic environment adaptation test and evaluation, this test untangles the environment’s requirement based on the typical operation mission of the equipment, proposes the basic method for constructing the electromagnetic environment in the test, establishes the adaptation evaluation index system, and analyzes the effect of the complex electromagnetic environment on the intercept probability, reconnaissance range, and signal sorting. Considering the energy of jamming signals as reconnaissance’s noise, the distance formula in free space in complex electromagnetic environments is calculated and tested by simulation. The results show the significant decrease of reconnaissance range associated with the alignment between reconnaissance antenna and interference source. Integrating the operation influence of the different complexity of electromagnetic environment with adaptation status, this paper proposes a method for electromagnetic environment adaptation evaluation and shows the feasibility of the method by an example.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: A Rapid Convex Programming Method for Air-to-Air Missile Trajectory Based on Improved Trust-Region Algorithm [基于改进信赖域的空空导弹轨迹快速凸优化方法]
Authors: ZENG Yuwen [曾钰文], ZHANG Huijun [章惠君], and LIAO Xueyang [廖雪阳]
Affiliation: China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute [中国空空导弹研究院], Luoyang, Henan
Publisher: Aero Weaponry [航空兵器], vol. 32, 2025
Abstract: Aiming at the shortcomings of traditional guidance laws for air-to-air missiles in handling multiple nonlinear constraints during the mid-course guidance, this paper proposes an optimization method for mid-course guidance trajectory using sequential convex programming (SCP) and designs an improved trust-region algorithm to enhance the convergence performance of the optimization. Firstly, taking the parabola trajectory of an air-to-air missile in the longitudinal plane as the research object, considering the endpoint constraints, path constraints, and state constraints, after linearizing and discretizing the original state equations and constraints, it establishes the standard convex optimization problem model. On this basis, this paper analyzes the traditional trust-region algorithm and proposes an improved algorithm. It adopts a two-phase solution strategy: the first phase addresses the terminal constraint violation caused by the reference trajectories, while the second phase achieves rapid convergence to the optimal trajectory to significantly improve the solving efficiency and convergence stability of the convex programming problem. Through digital simulation experiments, the optimality and convergence of the proposed algorithm and pseudo-spectral method are compared and analyzed. The results indicate that the proposed algorithm can quickly generate satisfactory mid-course guidance trajectories to provide an effective solution for autonomous online guidance of air-to-air missiles under target maneuvering conditions.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: Collaborative Robot Assisted Assembly System for Aerospace Product Cabin Components [导弹舱内部件的协作机器人辅助装配系统]
Authors: YANG Bo [杨波], WEI Faming [韦发明], GUAN Yajuan [管雅娟], and LIU Chi [刘驰]
Affiliation: Shanghai Spaceflight Precision Machinery Institute [上海航天精密机械研究所], Shanghai
Publisher: Automation & Instrumentation [指挥系统与智能制造], vol. 40, no. 3
Abstract: This article investigates the current application status of collaborative robots in the aviation and aerospace fields. Based on product characteristics and analysis of existing assembly processes, a collaborative robot assisted assembly system is designed. Key contents such as the selection of collaborative robots, end fixture design, collaborative assembly process flow, and collaborative trajectory are elaborated in detail. Assembly process application experiments are conducted, and future optimization prospects are proposed. The application of this system not only reduces the labor intensity of operators but also improves assembly efficiency and overall enhances the automation level of component assembly, providing useful reference for further realizing fully automated assembly operations.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Title: The Impact of the Starlink Program on Helicopter Development [星链计划对直升机发展的影响]
Authors: XU Danqing [许丹青] and DAI Yinfang [戴银芳]
Affiliation: China Helicopter Design Institute [中国直升机设计研究所], Tianjin
Publisher: China Science and Technology Information [中国科技信息], vol. 5
Abstract: Helicopters, as versatile aircraft, possess excellent low-altitude maneuvering capabilities such as vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and hovering in mid-air. They are widely utilized in both military and civilian sectors, demonstrating broad applications and promising development prospects. However, due to limitations in traditional communication and navigation systems, helicopters face challenges such as communication interruptions, navigation difficulties, and inefficient data transmission in certain environments. The launch of the Starlink program provides new possibilities to overcome these issues. This paper discusses the impact of the Starlink program on helicopter development in both military and civilian contexts, as well as its current applications in rescue helicopter operations.
Link to Original Text (CNKI)
Section V: PLA Observers
Joel Wuthnow, “Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA?” China Leadership Monitor, February 28, 2025, https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla.
Eric Hundman, “China’s Air Defense Radar Industrial Base,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, March 10, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4113558/chinas-air-defense-radar-industrial-base.
Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 12, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-03/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2025.
Suyash Desai, “Forceful Taiwan Reunification: China’s Targeted Military and Civilian-Military Measures,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 11, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/forceful-taiwan-reunification-chinas-targeted-military-and-civilian-military-measures.
K. Tristan Tang, “CMSI Note 13: PLA Navy Enhances Realistic Combat Training: Observations of PLA Navy Operations Around Taiwan,” U.S Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, March 13, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/13.
Ryan D. Martinson, “Fujian Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 5 (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/fujians-unveils-incentives-for-militia-training-for-a-cross-strait-campaign.
Kenneth W. Allen, “Senior PLA Leader Military Diplomacy from October 2017 Through December 2024,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, March 17, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4113560/senior-pla-leader-military-diplomacy-from-october-2017-through-december-2024.
Jacob Stokes, “Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses,” Center for New American Security, March 18, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/assessing-chinas-nuclear-decision-making.
J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart, “CMSI Note 14: Bridges over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations,” U.S Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, March 20, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14.
Howard Wang, Jackson Smith, and Cristina L. Garafola, “Chinese Military Views of Low Earth Orbit: Proliferation, Starlink, and Desired Countermeasures,” RAND Corporation, March 24, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3139-1.html.
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2025, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-shipyard-tiers.
“Chinese, US militaries advancing exchanges as planned: Chinese defense ministry,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), March 27, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16377296.html.
“China, Iran and Russia to Conduct Joint Naval Exercise in March,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), March 9, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/MilitaryServices/News_213106/16373856.html. Please note that the April edition of PLA Watch will feature the PLA drills near Taiwan from April 1-2, 2025.
“China-Russia Northern/Interaction-2024 exercise wraps up,” China Military Online, September 29, 2024, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/MEDIA/Videos/16341795.html.
“中伊海军在霍尔木兹海峡演习 或引起美国忧虑？” [China and Iran's Naval Drill in the Strait of Hormuz May Raise U.S. Concerns?], People.com, June 19, 2017, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0619/c1011-29347987.html.
“2025年3月国防部例行记者会文字实录” [Transcript of the March 2025 Ministry of National Defense Regular Press Conference], Ministry of National Defense (PRC), March 27, 2025, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/sy/tt_214026/16377297.html.
“Military News Update: PLA Activities in the Waters and Airspace Around Taiwan,” Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China (ROC), March 18, 2025, https://www.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?title=News+Channel&SelectStyle=Military+News+Update+&p=84156.
“核战争距离人类有多远?” [How Close Is Nuclear War to Humanity?], 世界军事网 [World Military Network], March 4, 2025, https://m.wforum.com/news/reviews/2025/03/04/490599.html.
“习近平在出席解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议时强调：落实高质量发展要求 实现我军建设‘十四五’规划圆满收官” [Xi Jinping Emphasizes the Need to Meet High-Quality Development Goals and Successfully Conclude the 14th Five-Year Plan for Military Development at the Plenary Meeting of the PLA and PAP Delegation], State Council (PRC), March 7, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202503/content_7011635.htm.