PLA Watch #5: May 2025
From Center for China Analysis: Newsletter on China’s Military Activities
Welcome to the May edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest developments in Chinese military affairs and writings using primary sources.
PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.
This month’s issue tracks the PLA Air Force’s first long-range joint exercise in Egypt and its largest-ever bilateral drill with Cambodia, underscoring China’s growing expeditionary capabilities; the Liaoning carrier group’s first training near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; and deepening defense ties with Thailand. Beyond the headlines, it offers in-depth analysis of recent PLA writings that highlight data integration, real-time information sharing, and decision-making dominance as critical to future battlefield success. New legal protections for military-industrial facilities amid espionage concerns and increasing civil-military integration are also deciphered.
Written by:
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis
Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis
Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis
With support from:
Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis
Section I: PLA News
Exercise (1 of 2): China and Egypt Conduct Joint Air Force Exercise
From April 19 to May 4, China and Egypt conducted their first-ever large-scale joint air force exercise, codenamed “Eagles of Civilization-2025.” Hosted on Egyptian soil, the drill featured a full spectrum of air combat elements, including fighter jets, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, aerial refueling tankers, and helicopters, and focused on combat simulations designed to establish air superiority and suppress enemy air defenses. Specific operations included aerial refueling, electronic countermeasures, battlefield search and rescue, and precision strikes under an integrated command structure.1 Chinese state media emphasized both the “actual combat” orientation of the drills and the symbolic milestone of flying PLA Air Force assets across continents for extended operations.2
CCA Analysis: The exercise represents a step-change in China’s military engagement in the Middle East. Moving beyond symbolic port visits and low-intensity peacekeeping missions, it centered on joint combat effectiveness and command integration with a non-aligned partner. A Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson characterized the exercise as “deepening substantive cooperation” between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries.3
In addition, the operation showcased the PLA Air Force’s maturing expeditionary capabilities. The deployment of a systematic, integrated force package—including the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, Y-20 transporters, and the YY-20 aerial refueling platform—represented the first such comprehensive projection into Africa. Chinese military analysts portrayed the exercise as a benchmark in “rapid projection, long-range operations, and joint command coordination,” signaling progress in the PLA’s airpower transformation.4
Moreover, the exercise served as a high-profile platform for China to promote its defense exports in a competitive regional arms market. Egypt has reportedly agreed to purchase the HQ-9 air defense system and is rumored to be considering acquisition of the J-10C multirole fighter.5 Such deals, if finalized, would significantly elevate Beijing’s military footprint in the Middle East and potentially alter the regional balance of air defense and strike capabilities.
Meanwhile, the deepening military ties between Beijing and Cairo have raised alarms in Washington, particularly given Egypt’s longstanding role as a major recipient of U.S. defense systems. Although there is no indication that American-made F-16s were involved in the Eagles of Civilization-2025 exercise, U.S. policymakers are likely to interpret any future use of U.S.-origin platforms in combined drills with Chinese forces as a violation of end-use expectations, prompting a reevaluation of U.S.-Egypt defense ties.
Exercise (2 of 2): China and Cambodia Hold Annual Joint Military Exercise
From May 17 to May 28, China and Cambodia carried out the “Golden Dragon-2025” joint military exercise, the seventh iteration of their annual bilateral drills and the most ambitious to date. Held at multiple locations in Cambodia, including the newly expanded Ream Naval Base, the exercise highlighted the growing scale, complexity, and long-term strategic relevance of China-Cambodia defense ties.
For the first time, the PLA deployed radar units and helicopters to a cross-border joint drill, integrating air, land, and sea operations under a single command structure. The drill featured participation from all three PLA branches and included antiterrorism drills, amphibious assault simulations, disaster response operations, and maritime search and rescue training.6[1] Chinese troops also participated in urban warfare training alongside their Cambodian counterparts, simulating hostage rescue and counterinsurgency scenarios. The expanded Ream base, renovated with Chinese assistance and now capable of hosting large warships, served as the exercise’s logistical hub.
CCA Analysis: Golden Dragon-2025 reflects Beijing’s deepening strategic investments in Southeast Asia and ongoing effort to cultivate forward-operating capacity. Beyond practical training value, the exercise signals China’s intent to enhance military access in the Gulf of Thailand, a key transit point between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The first-ever deployment of PLA radar troops and helicopters highlights Beijing’s growing confidence in projecting force and sustaining joint operations in a foreign territory.
In addition, the use of the expanded Ream Naval Base underscores China’s long-term interest in establishing logistical—and potentially rotational—access in the region. While Beijing maintains that it has no plans for a permanent base, the scale and complexity of this year’s exercise indicate a push to normalize the PLA’s presence and embed Chinese security influence within Cambodia’s defense infrastructure.
Training: Liaoning Carrier Holds First Training in the East China Sea
On May 25, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported that five PLA Navy vessels—including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, two Type 052D guided-missile destroyers, and two Type 054A frigates—were operating approximately 149 miles north of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.7 This marks the Liaoning’s first publicly reported presence in proximity to the contested area. During the operation, the carrier conducted flight training exercises of carrier-based fighter jets and helicopters, including takeoff and landing drills. The group later sailed through the Miyako Strait before entering waters southeast of Taiwan. Separately, Chinese media reported that the Liaoning had recently conducted damage control exercises, although the timing and location were not disclosed.8 In response, a Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated that the exercises “were not directed at any specific country or target” and “in accordance with international law and international norms.”9
CCA Analysis: The Liaoning’s deployment appears closely tied to the PLA’s broader exercises in the Taiwan Strait following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s May 20th address. It may also serve as a countermeasure to the USS Nimitz carrier strike group’s presence in the South China Sea. In addition, according to Chinese military commentator Song Zhongping (宋忠平), the concurrent positioning of China’s two active aircraft carriers—Shandong to Taiwan’s east and Liaoning to its north—signals the PLA’s readiness to implement an “effective blockade” of Taiwan. The dual-carrier posture, he argues, is designed to “prevent extraregional intervention and obstruct the U.S. military’s ability to maneuver between the Western Pacific and South China Sea” while simultaneously “cutting off Taiwan’s retreat routes to Okinawa, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.”10
Strategically, this operation reflects China’s effort to “normalize” high-intensity naval activity in contested waters. By staging a carrier exercise near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Beijing not only asserts its claims but also accustoms regional actors to an enduring Chinese naval presence. The Liaoning’s role as a platform for sustained deterrence and operational experimentation in politically charged waters underscores its growing symbolic and strategic value.
Diplomacy: PLA Hosts Senior Thai Delegation in High-Level Military Talks
On May 22, General Liu Zhenli, member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, met with General Songwit Noonpackdee, chief of defense forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, in Beijing. The visit closely followed the conclusion of the China-Thailand Blue Strike-2025 joint naval exercise in April. According to official readouts, the two sides “exchanged views on issues of common concern” and agreed to “strengthen strategic communication and deepen cooperation in joint exercises and training.”11
In a separate meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun also held talks with General Noonpackdee. Dong hailed the military cooperation between the two nations and said China is willing to work with Thailand to “further enhance the level of cooperation in such areas as joint exercises and personnel training.”12
CCA Analysis: The meetings between the two countries’ top military officials reflect China’s ongoing campaign to deepen defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia. While Thailand remains a close ally of the United States, it has increasingly leaned into a hedging posture by balancing military engagements with both Washington and Beijing. From China’s perspective, Thailand serves as a pivotal defense partner: it is central to regional security architecture, has extensive military infrastructure, and bridges the Mekong subregion and the maritime domain.
Strategically, the meetings advance China’s dual-track approach of combining hard-power projection with sustained diplomatic outreach. Amid growing U.S. military activities in the South China Sea and frequent freedom of navigation operations, the PLA’s diplomatic overtures to Thailand allow Beijing to exert influence from within the region’s security network.
Section II: PLA Strategy
Data Integration Is Key to Battlefield Success
A recent series of articles in the People’s Liberation Army Daily highlights the PLA’s growing emphasis on data as a critical asset in modern warfare. Across seven pieces published in May, PLA writers stress that the success of future military operations depends on the ability to collect, share, and exploit real-time data across services, domains, and platforms. The pieces collectively reveal both PLA aspirations for data-driven joint operations and the persistent institutional and technological challenges it faces.
The series opens with a discussion on the concept of “data thinking” as foundational to improved military decision-making.13 PLA scholars argue that data not only supports accurate judgments and planning but also helps overcome cognitive biases. Quoting Xi Jinping’s call for military cadres to master data collection and analysis, the article underscores that data superiority equates to decision-making superiority. Yet, many officers still rely on intuition or experience over empirical analysis—a gap the PLA acknowledges and aims to address through training and leadership reform.
Another article details efforts by a missile brigade to connect the command chain through improved data links and seamless data sharing for reconnaissance, command, and strike coordination.14 The author emphasizes that the ability to conduct real-time situational assessments and task allocation across services defines modern joint warfare. However, this vision is hindered by significant hurdles: hardware-software incompatibility, siloed data systems, and a lack of data literacy among commanders. Some officers struggle with information overload or over-rely on automated systems, creating risks if those systems fail.
One article focuses on how data influences PLA thinking on enemy planning and operations - a burgeoning field of study within the PLA. It calls for the development of “anti-AI warfare” strategies, recognizing that adversaries such as the United States will rely heavily on AI-driven systems in future conflicts.15 PLA strategists advocate not just adopting AI but also anticipating and countering adversarial algorithms and decision loops through asymmetric, counter-disruption tactics.
Operational planning, another theme in the series, is portrayed as inseparable from data mastery.16 Real-time data transmission is seen as the key to rapidly assessing enemy strengths and weaknesses, thereby enabling faster and more informed strike decisions. One piece emphasizes that knowing the adversary’s force posture, intentions, and systems architecture (e.g., its reconnaissance and communications platforms) is essential to defeating their kill chains.
A final article offers a framework for step-by-step analysis of an enemy’s strategy and force structure.17 It recommends quantifying enemy vulnerabilities and projecting potential actions using effectiveness ratios and modeling. The PLA is particularly focused on identifying and exploiting weak links in adversary systems while protecting its own information networks from disruption.
CCA Analysis: This series of articles underscores the importance of data-enabled warfare in PLA thinking and strategy. Data is the new currency of war. Rapidly collecting, processing, and feeding battlefield data to the warfighter across various platforms and joint command posts is an ongoing priority for the PLA. The dissemination of data enables the PLA to execute what it calls “intelligentized warfare” and achieve information dominance over adversaries. For the PLA, attacking adversary kill chains and waging cognitive warfare remain core operational imperatives for modern warfare success. What is striking about these articles is their frank assessment of shortfalls in integrating data into the sophisticated platforms that the PLA is fielding. The PLA continues to struggle to field technically proficient officers and recruits with the appropriate skill sets to operate such platforms. When AI-infused technology is added into the mix, the problem set becomes even more formidable.
Section III: PLA Modernization
New Regulation Clarifies Protection of China’s Military Industry Facilities
On May 26, 2025, the State Council and Central Military Commission jointly issued the Regulation on the Protection of Important Military Industry Facilities (重要军工设施保护条例),18 marking the first time China has legally defined and instituted a protection framework specifically for infrastructure operated by defense industry entities tasked with national defense research and production. It fills a longstanding legal gap left by the Law on the Protection of Military Facilities (中华人民共和国军事设施保护法), last amended in 2021, which primarily focused on facilities directly used by the armed forces.19
The new regulation expands protection to facilities operated by both state-owned and private companies that undertake national defense science and technology tasks. These include research and production centers, testing sites, warehouses, communication hubs, and infrastructure such as dedicated railways, airports, and ports. The regulation sets rules for designating protection zones, clarifies the responsibilities of enterprises and local governments, and introduces technical and legal mechanisms to prevent sabotage, espionage, and leakage of classified information. It also mandates security perimeters, approval procedures for accessing restricted areas, and penalties for violations.
CCA Analysis: The new regulation reflects China’s growing concern over the vulnerability of its defense industrial base amid an evolving strategic environment. A major factor is the deepening of civil-military fusion, a policy elevated under President Xi Jinping since 2013. By emphasizing the protection of facilities operated by entities “undertaking national defense research and production,” the regulation responds directly to the integration of civilian and military sectors in weapons development and logistics support.
This shift has presented new challenges for security and secrecy. As defense tasks are increasingly shared with nonmilitary institutions, some personnel may lack adequate awareness or training in preventing leaks of sensitive information. Meanwhile, the expansion of surveillance capabilities among the general public—fueled by smartphones, drones, and widespread internet connectivity—has heightened the risk of unintended or malicious leaks.
Recent years have seen several cases that highlight the urgency of the issue. In one case, an employee at a mapping company used a drone to collect high-resolution geographic data near a sensitive military site without authorization, storing detailed imagery that posed a significant risk to national security.20
Directives such as the Interim Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the Administrative Measures on Military Information Dissemination on the Internet, and the revised Counter-Espionage Law in 2023 have already been enacted to address these issues.21 The new regulation complements these efforts by codifying ground-level protection for physical infrastructure.
The timing of this legal reinforcement also reflects a strategic calculation. As tensions with Washington persist, Beijing has intensified efforts to secure its military advantage. The United States has imposed a series of export controls and investment restrictions aimed at limiting China’s access to advanced technologies that could support PLA modernization. Meanwhile, an arms race is emerging in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic weapons. In this context, strengthening the legal framework around defense infrastructure is part of a broader strategy to reinforce strategic resilience and protect core military-industrial capabilities.
Section IV: PLA Research Highlights
Title: Perspective on the Characteristic of the Command and Control of Drone Combat Systems of the Practice in the Ukraine Battlefield [从俄乌战场实践透视无人机作战系统指挥控制特点]
Authors: LI Zhiqiang [李志强]¹, ZHU Yiyong [朱义勇]¹, XU Qingfeng [徐青锋]¹, ZHAO Hongliang [赵宏亮]²
Affiliation: 1. College of Information and Communication, National University of Science and Technology [国防科技大学信息通信学院], Wuhan, Hubei; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 31698 [解放军31698部队], Huludao, Liaoning.
Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]
Abstract: In Ukrainian Crisis, both sides have deployed a large number of drones for offensive and defensive operations. Against the backdrop of the competing development of joint all-domain command and control, the command and control of drone combat systems is characterized by agility, distribution, collective intelligence, integration, and survivability. These characteristics have certain reference significance for the future operations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
Title: On the Development of Command Information System from the Perspective of Ukrainian Crisis [从乌克兰危机看未来指挥信息系统建设发展]
Authors: QIU Rongrui [邱荣瑞], ZHANG Zhantian [张占田]
Affiliation: College of Information and Communication, National University of Science and Technology [国防科技大学信息通信学院], Wuhan, Hubei.
Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]
Abstract: The Ukrainian Crisis is a mixed war with intelligent characteristics. Bringing new challenges to the application of military command information system. According to the demand of battlefield command and control guarantee, the construction and application of military command information system in Russia and Ukraine have made new progress, which provides important reference for the construction and development of military command information system in the future. On the basis of analyzing the general situation of Russian-Ukrainian command information system construction, through the characteristics of both parties' application in the war, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the construction and development of command information system in the future, which is of great significance to the construction and development of command information system under the background of new military reform.
Title: Application and Implications of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations in the Ukrainian Crisis [乌克兰危机无人机作战运用及启示]
Authors: YANG Jian [杨俭], CHEN Yijian [陈一剑], GENG Fanjunzhe [耿樊骏喆]
Affiliation: College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology [国防科技大学电子对抗学院], Hefei, Anhui.
Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]
Abstract: Since Ukrainian Crisis, as the battlefield situation has been evolving, both Russia and Ukraine have engaged in intense confrontations in the field of unmanned combat. Unmanned combat forces have even become an important weapon influencing the battlefield situation, demonstrating significant effectiveness in countering traditional weaponry and showcasing a completely different unmanned combat form from traditional combat patterns. In the face of the vigorous development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) military applications worldwide, we must pay attention to the opportunities and challenges brought by UAV combat, fully absorb the beneficial practices and experiences of our opponents, and provide guidance for the construction and application of our own UAVs.
Title: The Problem of Anti -hypersonic Missile Combat [反高超声速导弹作战问题研究]
Authors: XU Tong [徐桐], LIU Xingang [刘新刚], WANG Hui [王辉], LIU Xiangfeng [刘向峰], WANG Song [王松]
Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army Unit 63610 [解放军63610部队], Korla, Xinjiang UAR.
Publisher: Proceedings of the 13th China Conference on Command and Control [第十三届中国指挥控制大会论文集]
Abstract: New combat forces represented by hypersonic missiles are rapidly emerging, which will affect the way of combat and reshape the military struggle pattern. Firstly, the motion characteristics and capabilities of hypersonic missiles were analyzed, and the idea of anti-hypersonic warfare was conceived. Secondly, innovative methods for countering hypersonic missiles were explored. Finally, solutions were proposed for key issues in interception warfare.
Section V: PLA Observers
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Xi Can’t Trust His Own Military,” New York Times, May 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/opinion/china-taiwan-xi-jinping.html.
James Giordano, “China’s Cockpit Advances Pose Challenges for U.S. Combat Pilots,” National Defense, May 7, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/7/analysis-analysis-chinas-cockpit-advances-pose-challenges-for-us-combat-pilots.
Cheryl Yu, “PRC Logistics Firms in the United States and Mexico Support Military-Civil Fusion,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 9, May 9, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/prc-logistics-firms-in-the-united-states-and-mexico-support-military-civil-fusion.
John Chen and Joel Wuthnow, “Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy,” CMSI, May 9, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/18.
Tin Pak and Yu-cheng Chen, “Weaponizing the Electromagnetic Spectrum: The PRC’s High-Powered Microwave Warfare Ambitions,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 9, May 9, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/weaponizing-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-the-prcs-high-powered-microwave-warfare-ambitions.
John S. Van Oudenaren, “Taking Flight: China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Industry,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, May 12, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4147816/taking-flight-chinas-military-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav-industry.
Benjamin Frohman and Jeremy Rausch, eds., “The PLA in a Complex Security Environment: Preparing for High Winds and Choppy Waters,” National Bureau of Asian Research, May 15, 2025, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-pla-in-a-complex-security-environment-preparing-for-high-winds-and-choppy-waters.
Sanjay Kannoth, “China’s Strategic Culture and Its Impact on the People’s Liberation Army,” United Service Institution of India, May 16, 2025, https://www.usiofindia.org/pdf/China's%20Strategic%20Culture.pdf.
Kevin Pollpeter, Elizabeth Barrett, and April Herlevi, “Deterring China’s Use of Force in the Space Domain,” CNA, May 19, 2025, https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/05/deterring-chinas-use-of-force-in-the-space-domain.
Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, “China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare,” RAND Corporation, May 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-4.html.
K. Tristan Tang, “Latest PLA Anti-Corruption Campaign Enhances Xi Jinping’s Control over the Military,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 10, May 23, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/latest-pla-anti-corruption-campaign-enhances-xi-jinpings-control-over-the-military.
Joel Wuthnow, “How China Could Counter U.S. Intervention in War over Taiwan,” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/how-china-could-counter-u-s-intervention-in-war-over-taiwan.
Andrew S. Erickson, “China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China’s Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings,” CMSI, May 28, 2025, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/47.
“Chinese, Egyptian Air Forces Hold Joint Training in Egypt,” Xinhua, May 8, 2025, https://english.news.cn/africa/20250508/c6f7da6d75f844b5a288c30c7ae795f1/c.html.
Liu Xuanzun, Liang Rui, and Guo Yuandan, “China, Egypt Wrap Up First Joint Air Force Training, Practice Air Superiority Combat, Suppressive Air Defense,” Global Times, May 5, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333341.shtml.
“Regular Press Briefing of the Ministry of National Defense on May 8th, 2025,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), press release, May 14, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16385898.html.
Enoch Wong, “China’s KJ-500 Radar Aircraft Overseas for First Time in Joint Drill with Egypt,” South China Morning Post, April 22, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3307477/chinas-kj-500-radar-aircraft-overseas-first-time-joint-drill-egypt.
“Defense: Egypt Bolsters Air Defense with China’s HQ-9B amid Israel Concerns,” Aero News Journal, April 17, 2025, https://www.aeronewsjournal.com/2025/04/defense-egypt-bolsters-air-defense-with.html; and Amber Wang, “Egyptian Pilot on Board China’s J-10 Fighter Jet Renews Arms Sale Speculation,” South China Morning Post, May 7, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3309392/egyptian-pilot-board-chinas-j-10-fighter-jet-renews-arms-sale-speculation.
“中柬‘金龙-2025’联演开演，专家解读三大亮点” [China-Cambodia “Golden Dragon-2025” Joint Exercise Begins; Experts Analyze Three Major Highlights], Xinhua, May 19, 2025, http://www.news.cn/milpro/20250519/14fa1dcb3994482e98cee08cdb66c3f2/c.html.
Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Liaoning Operating near Taiwan,” USNI News, May 28, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/05/28/chinese-aircraft-carrier-liaoning-operating-near-taiwan.
“迅速恢复战斗能力 直击辽宁舰损管训练” [Rapidly Restoring Combat Capability: A Look Inside Liaoning Carrier’s Damage Control Training], Huanqiu, May 26, 2025, https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/4MqXgL0KpOE.
“2025年5月国防部例行记者会文字实录” [Full Transcript of the May 2025 Ministry of National Defense Press Conference], Ministry of National Defense (PRC), May 29, 2025, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16388794.html.
Wang Weiwen, “日本官方称辽宁舰东海演练百次舰载机起降 分析：防美日介入台海战事” [Japanese Authorities Say Liaoning Carrier Conducted 100 Aircraft Takeoffs and Landings in East China Sea—Analysis: Aimed at Deterring U.S.-Japan Intervention in Taiwan Conflict], Lianhe Zaobao, May 28, 2025, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20250528-6504025.
“Senior Chinese Military Official Holds Talks with Chief of Defence Forces of Royal Thai Armed Forces,” Ministry of National Defense (PRC), May 22, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16387528.html.
“Chinese Defense Minister Meets with Chief of Defence Forces of Royal Thai Armed Forces,” Ministry of National Defense (PRC), May 23, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16387754.html.
Xiao Fangming, “强化数据思维 提高决策水平” [Strengthening Data Thinking to Improve Decision-Making Capabilities], People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 16, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-05-16&paperNumber=02&articleid=955098.
Su Xinbo, “善用数据链贯通指挥链” [Effectively Using Data Links to Connect the Command Chain], People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 19, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-05-19&paperNumber=06&articleid=955351.
Kang Ruizhi and Li Shengjie, “关注智能化战争中的反人工智能作战” [Focusing on Counter-AI Operations in Intelligentized Warfare], People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 20, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-05-20&paperNumber=07&articleid=955393.
Che Dongwei, “把握作战筹划内在要求” [Grasping the Inner Requirements of Operational Planning], People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 22, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-05-22&paperNumber=11&articleid=955591.
Gao Kai, “在层层递进中研透作战对手” [Analyzing the Adversary Through Progressive Layers], People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 22, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-05-22&paperNumber=11&articleid=955592.
“受权发布丨重要军工设施保护条例” [Authorized Release: Regulations on the Protection of Important Military Industrial Facilities], Xinhua, May 26, 2025, http://www3.xinhuanet.com/politics/20250526/46fbc1b212dd44fbb8f0dd6e4849c668/c.html.
“中华人民共和国军事设施保护法” [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Military Installations], State Council (PRC), June 11, 2021, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-06/11/content_5616914.htm.
“用无人机非法拍摄新型军舰，一军事论坛发烧友获刑” [Military Enthusiast Sentenced for Illegally Filming New-Type Warships with a Drone], Huanqiu, June 20, 2024, https://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/4IHR21ioMJR.
“无人驾驶航空器飞行管理暂行条例” [Interim Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], State Council (PRC), June 28, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202306/content_6888799.htm; “关于印发《互联网军事信息传播管理办法》的通知” [Notice on the Issuance of the “Measures for the Administration of Online Military Information Dissemination”], Ministry of Public Security (PRC), February 9, 2025, https://www.mps.gov.cn/n6557558/c9966718/content.html; and “中华人民共和国反间谍法” [Counter-Espionage Law of the People’s Republic of China], State Council (PRC), April 27, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm.