PLA Watch #6: Jun 2025

Dual-carrier exercise; rule of law in the military; call for drone strategy

Welcome to the June edition of PLA Watch, a monthly newsletter from the Center for China Analysis that provides insights into the latest developments in Chinese military affairs and writings using primary sources.

PLA Watch is divided into five sections: PLA News covers major announcements, leadership visits, and military exercises; PLA Strategy examines interpretations of Xi Jinping’s military thought and writings by PLA strategists on doctrine and warfare; PLA Modernization focuses on how PLA authors propose integrating new technologies into operations; PLA Research Highlights curates recent academic publications by PLA scholars; and PLA Observers features Western research on the PLA.

This month’s issue tracks developments in China’s expanding military footprint, institutional alignment, and defense modernization. The PLA Navy’s first-ever dual-carrier deployment beyond the second island chain signals growing blue-water ambitions and functions as a rehearsal for contingencies involving U.S. and allied forces. In parallel, China continues to institutionalize its defense diplomacy through high-level engagements with South Africa and regional multilateral forums, embedding its operational standards and strategic narratives. On the domestic front, Xi Jinping’s recent Henan tour has prompted a renewed push to align internal discipline with combat readiness. Finally, PLA strategists are sounding alarms over the lack of operational theory guiding the military’s rapidly growing drone force, revealing a broader challenge of integrating new capabilities into coherent strategic planning.

Written by:

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis

Jie Gao, Research Associate, Center for China Analysis

Zhutongle Wei, Intern, Center for China Analysis

With support from:

Ian Lane Smith, Research Associate (Editorial), Center for China Analysis

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Section I: PLA News

Exercise: PLA Navy Conducts Dual-Carrier Operations Beyond the Second Island Chain

On June 8 and 9, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported that two PLA Navy carrier strike groups—centered around aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong and accompanied by three Type 055 stealth guided-missile destroyers, three Type 052D destroyers, three Type 054A frigates, and three replenishment ships—were operating in the western Pacific near Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).¹ In an unusual public disclosure on June 17, Japan released official tracking data showing that the Liaoning transited the Miyako Strait in late May en route to waters near Minamitorishima, Japan’s easternmost territory, where it conducted around 550 fighter and helicopter sorties. Separately, the Shandong operated near Okinotorishima, Japan’s southernmost point, carrying out approximately 230 sorties. As of June 16, both carrier groups remained in the Philippine Sea.²

In response, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) described the exercises as “routine” and “not directed at any specific country,” adding that they were “in accordance with international law and international norms.”³ The ministry’s spokesperson also accused Japanese aircraft and vessels of repeated close-range interference and of “deliberately creating maritime and air safety risks.”⁴

Source: @detresfa_, X, June 17, 2025

CCA Analysis: The dual-carrier operation signals China’s growing proficiency in blue-water naval ambitions. It marks the first time the PLA Navy has simultaneously deployed both of its active-duty aircraft carriers beyond the second island chain, representing both deterrence and operational experimentation. The exercises demonstrated the navy’s maturing ability to conduct “system of systems” joint combat operations at extended distances, supported by layered escort formations, integrated logistics, and sustained flight training in far-seas conditions. Strategically, the operation offered the PLA a valuable opportunity to rehearse scenarios aimed at delaying or disrupting U.S. and allied reinforcement efforts in the early stages of a Taiwan contingency.

Chinese analysts also drew connections between the operation and the USS George Washington’s redeployment to the western Pacific around the same time, characterizing the U.S. move as a “symbolic gesture.” Tang Hua, director of the Cross-Strait Relations Research Institute at Xiamen University’s Taiwan Research Institute, argued that the PLA Navy has now achieved “comprehensive superiority in equipment technology, realistic training, and system integration.” According to Tang, the dual-carrier deployment not only established a “substantial strategic deterrent toward Guam” but also reflects a “profound shift in the strategic balance between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific.”⁵

Diplomacy: China and South Africa Hold Defense Committee Meeting

On June 10, the 10th China–South Africa Defense Committee meeting was held in Beijing. The assembly was co-chaired by Jing Jianfeng, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Rudzani Maphwanya, chief of the South African National Defence Force. According to the MND press release, the two sides discussed international and regional security issues, military exchanges, and areas of mutual concern. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to “further explore cooperation prospects, broaden cooperation areas, and enhance levels of collaboration.”⁶

In a separate meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun held talks with General Maphwanya. Dong hailed the longstanding friendship between the two countries and called for both sides to “strengthen strategic communication, optimize cooperation mechanisms, expand pragmatic cooperation,” and “promote deeper and broader mil-to-mil relations.”⁷

CCA Analysis: The China–South Africa Defense Committee serves as a key institutional mechanism in Beijing’s broader security engagement with Africa. South Africa occupies a distinctive position as a continental military power, a founding BRICS⁸ member, and one of the top African contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. China’s military ties with South Africa date back to the 1960s and have since evolved to include cooperation in military technology, personnel training, and joint naval exercises. By maintaining regular high-level military dialogues, Beijing is reinforcing its narrative of “mutual respect and non-interference” while fostering interoperability with African armed forces.

At the operational level, enhanced ties with South Africa could offer the PLA expanded access to training environments and logistical hubs in the Southern Hemisphere. The relationship also aligns with Beijing’s broader push to institutionalize its defense diplomacy, transforming ad hoc military exchanges into stable, long-term partnerships embedded in multilateral frameworks such as BRICS, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, and the United Nations.

China–South Africa military ties have been on the U.S. military’s radar for a few years, ever since the U.S. Department of Commerce sanctioned a private, China-owned aviation company in South Africa for recruiting U.S. and allied pilots.⁹ General James B. Hecker, commander of NATO Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, warned U.S. and allied aircrew members in February 2025 to “avoid employment with privately owned aviation companies backing the People’s Republic of China.”¹⁰

Multilateral Engagement: China Hosts 20th ADMM-Plus Peacekeeping Working Group

From June 11 to 14, the PLA Nanjing Army Command College hosted the 20th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in Nanjing. Held under the theme “Technology and Innovation: Enhancing Military Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations,” the event brought together more than 80 representatives from 21 countries and international organizations, including member states, dialogue partners, observer states, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Participants discussed a range of topics, including the use of unmanned and counter-unmanned technologies in peacekeeping operations, the application of artificial intelligence, and the deployment of new technologies and equipment for mission-area security. According to an MND statement, the meeting aimed to “explore the military application of emerging technologies in peacekeeping operations, deepen military mutual trust and security cooperation among regional countries, and enhance their capacities in carrying out peacekeeping operations.”¹¹

Source: China National Radio, June 15, 2025

CCA Analysis: The meeting underscores China’s desire to play a central role in shaping the institutional frameworks and technical standards of regional peacekeeping. While Beijing has long been a top contributor of peacekeeping personnel among UN Security Council permanent members, it has recently shifted focus toward influencing training norms, doctrine, and operational architecture through multilateral forums. ADMM-Plus serves a dual function. On one hand, it projects an image of the PLA as a responsible, professional force committed to international security; on the other, it functions as a platform for soft-power projection, helping Beijing embed its standards and operational practices into multilateral processes.

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Section II: PLA Strategy

Xi’s “Work Style” Regulations During Henan Inspection Tour Filter Down to PLA

On May 19–20, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour of Henan province, where he emphasized the importance of the “Central Eight Regulations” as a foundational tool for Chinese Communist Party governance in the new era. In response, two scholars from the PLA’s National Defense University, Wei Yukuan (魏玉宽) and Jiang Guangyou (江光友), published a June 13 People’s Liberation Army Daily article, “Using Practical Standards to Test Learning Effectiveness,”¹² and argued that the PLA must fully absorb the political spirit of Xi’s speech and translate it into concrete improvements in military governance.

The article highlights two main areas: 1) correcting “bad work styles,” such as unauthorized banquets, gift-giving, and failure to protect grassroots interests; and 2) establishing systems to evaluate the effectiveness of ideological education. The authors link these efforts to earlier regulations issued by the CMC in 2012, framing them as essential to building a “loyal, clean, and responsible” cadre force.¹³

The inspection tour and commentary may be related to a recently released CMC guidance on military governance called the “Notice on Establishing and Improving the Responsibility System for the Construction of the Rule of Law in the Military.”¹⁴ The notice outlines updated duties, responsibilities, and measures for PLA officers in following the rule of law under the CMC Responsibility System (责任体系), to include “strong supervision and precise assessment of responsibilities.”¹⁵

CCA Analysis: Though PLA-affiliated scholars frequently amplify Xi’s political messages, this piece goes further by treating discipline reform as a matter of operational urgency. The emphasis on the root causes of misconduct signals dissatisfaction with prior campaigns that failed to produce lasting behavioral change. By calling out issues like lax oversight and formalism in training, the authors make clear that these problems continue to undermine both political authority and combat readiness.

A notable feature is the call for measuring ideological learning through practical outcomes—especially problem resolution, shifts in work style, and troop satisfaction. This reflects growing pressure within the PLA to institutionalize discipline as a foundation for organizational resilience. The piece also underscores a shift from campaign-style governance to law-based management, urging leaders to embed Xi’s expectations into routine decision-making, supervision, and feedback mechanisms.

“Satisfaction” as a barometer of progress also links internal governance to PLA morale and cohesion. The article implies that discipline, trust, and effectiveness must be felt by soldiers at the lowest levels, or else the reforms risk becoming hollow. Whether such reforms take root remains uncertain, but the growing attention to enforcement, supervision, and feedback channels suggests that leadership is seeking more than just rhetorical compliance.

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Section III: PLA Modernization

PLA Strategists Urge a Conceptual Framework for Drone Use

In a People’s Liberation Army Daily article titled “Innovative Operational Theory Needed for Drone Warfare,” PLA scholars Li Jian, Yao Zhihe, and Huang Yonggang call for the urgent development of a systematic theory for unmanned combat operations.¹⁶ They argue that as drone technology matures and procurement accelerates, the key challenge has shifted from technical breakthroughs to operational application. Without theoretical guidance, they warn, unmanned systems may fail to deliver on their potential or even become liabilities on the battlefield. The authors stress the need to explore and codify principles of drone employment to stay ahead of rapid changes in future warfare.

CCA Analysis: The PLA’s rapid development of drones is outpacing its ability to integrate unmanned systems into PLA doctrine. On the capability front, China has fielded a comprehensive range of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the Wing Loong II and the stealth CH-7. Drones have been a routine feature of PLA exercises, including Taiwan Strait drills, since 2022.¹⁷ A June 2025 report described joint training between PLA Air Force fighter jets and Army drones—an example of cross-service integration of unmanned systems.¹⁸

At the same time, PLA-affiliated analysts have closely studied recent conflicts, such as those in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Gaza, to assess emerging UAV tactics.¹⁹ These include integrating firepower with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; loitering munition strikes; saturation attacks using swarms; and decoy tactics to degrade enemy air defenses. These innovations underscore the expanding combat value of drones and the importance of clarifying China’s own operational concepts.

However, the PLA’s use of drones remains largely tactical and focused on enabling specific battlefield tasks, with little publicly visible thinking on how drones fit into broader campaign or deterrence frameworks. For instance, the 2020 edition of The Science of Military Strategy makes only a brief reference to using drones for electronic deception and signaling massed forces, mainly framing UAVs as tools for strategic camouflage.²⁰ While tactical integration is progressing, the PLA still appears to lack a coherent vision for how unmanned systems could shape campaign design or strategic posture in future wars.

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Section IV: PLA Research Highlights

Title: Thoughts on the Military Application and Development Strategy of U.S. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) [美无人潜航器军事应用与发展策略思考]

Authors: DING Lele [丁乐乐]¹^, ², GU Tianjun [顾天军]³, ZHAO Yuxiao [赵宇潇]⁴

Affiliation: 1. Naval Submarine Academy [海军潜艇学院], Qingdao; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 92330 [中国人民解放军92330部队], Qingdao; 3. China Shipbuilding 716 Research Institute [中国船舶716所], Lianyungang; 4. Naval Submarine Academy [海军潜艇学院], Qingdao.

Publisher: Command Control & Simulation

Date: 2025-06-11

Abstract: Based on open-source information from the Internet, this paper reviews the development plans of U.S. unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and analyzes the current state of UUV equipment construction by categorizing them into four classes: super-large, large, medium, and small. It further identifies eight typical military application scenarios in line with operational needs and technological developments: strategic deterrence, battlefield reconnaissance, mine countermeasures, target strikes, payload delivery, acting as network nodes, unmanned teaming operations, and swarm warfare. Drawing from the U.S. military’s experience in UUV development planning, equipment construction, and operational use, the authors summarize five development strategies: cascading development, systematization, generalization, standardization, and automation.

Title: Construction of Intelligent Equipment Capability Evaluation System [智能装备能力评估体系构建方法]

Authors: PENG Jinghui [彭京徽]¹, NI Yuantao [倪远韬]¹, HOU Ping [侯萍]², ZHAO Miao [赵苗]³, QU Lintao [曲林涛]⁴

Affiliation: 1. School of Artificial Intelligence, Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学人工智能学院], Wuhu, Anhui; 2. People’s Liberation Army Unit 71375 [中国人民解放军71375部队], Harbin, Heilongjiang; 3. Naval University of Engineering, School of Weapon Engineering [海军工程大学兵器工程学院], Wuhan, Hubei; 4. People’s Liberation Army Unit 92767 [中国人民解放军92767部队], Qingdao, Shandong.

Publisher: Journal of Unmanned Undersea Systems

Date: 2025-06-12

Abstract: The development of artificial intelligence promotes the transformation of the form and mode of war, and intelligent equipment has become the protagonist of intelligent war. In order to measure the capability of equipment scientifically, aiming at the shortcomings of the current assessment of intelligent equipment, the research is carried out around the methods, indicators, elements and systems. Firstly, summarized the evaluation methods of equipment capability, and sorted out the ideas of intelligent equipment evaluation. Secondly, analyzed the capability index of intelligent equipment from the aspects of capability requirements, performance parameters and task capability. Then, refined the intelligent multi-dimensional capability, and given the elements of intelligent equipment capability evaluation. Finally, six standard modules are refined, and a capability evaluation system for intelligent equipment is constructed.

Title: Progress in Unmanned Combat Systems Driven by Embodied Artificial Intelligence [具身智能驱动下的无人作战系统展望]

Authors: WANG Pengfei [王鹏飞], LIU Hongqin [刘红琴], CHEN Xiangchun [陈向春]

Affiliation: Army Artillery and Air Defense Academy [陆军炮兵防空兵学院], Hefei, Anhui

Publisher: Aero Weaponry

Date: 2025-06-12

Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive review of the current research landscape regarding embodied artificial intelligence, which represents a new paradigm in the development of artificial intelligence, and prospects its future applications in unmanned combat systems. First, it introduces the concept and historical development of embodied artificial intelligence and extracts three characteristics that distinguish it from traditional artificial intelligence: embodiment, multimodality, and interactivity. Subsequently, it meticulously details the key technologies for embodied artificial intelligence and their recent research progress. The paper then analyzes the urgent need for embodied artificial intelligence technologies in unmanned combat systems from three perspectives: the complexity of the battlefield environment, the complexity of combat missions, and the complexity of multi-domain confrontation, and it envisions the potential implementation forms of embodied artificial intelligence in unmanned combat systems in typical application scenarios. Finally, the paper summarizes the practical challenges associated with integrating embodied artificial intelligence into unmanned combat systems and proposes recommendations for the future development and application of embodied artificial intelligence. This study demonstrates that unmanned combat systems are on the cusp of a technological revolution centered on embodied artificial intelligence, and that deepening its technological application is crucial for gaining a strategic advantage in the forthcoming transformation of unmanned warfare.

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Section V: PLA Observers

Narantsatsral Enkhbat, “Friends with Benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises,” NATO Defense College, Outlook, no. 7, June 1, 2025, https://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=845.

J.E. Freeman-Mariani, “Checking in on Modernization and Reforms in the People’s Liberation Army,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 2, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4196851/checking-in-on-modernization-and-reforms-in-the-peoples-liberation-army.

Thomas Hader et al., “China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 4, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-gray-zone-infrastructure-strategy-tibetan-plateau-roads-dams-and-digital-domination.

Alex Lewis Richter, “Experts See Risk and Reward to Integrating AI in Nuclear Weapons,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 11, June 7, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/experts-see-risk-and-reward-to-integrating-ai-in-nuclear-weapons.

Adam Dhojnacki, “China Is Carrying Out ‘Dress Rehearsals’ to Take Taiwan. Here’s How the U.S. Should Respond,” Atlantic Council, June 9, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-is-carrying-out-dress-rehearsals-to-take-taiwan-heres-how-the-us-should-respond.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “China’s Basing Quest in the Gulf: Pipe Dream or Strategic Reality?” Atlantic Council, June 13, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/chinas-basing-quest-in-the-gulf-pipe-dream-or-strategic-reality.

Devon Johannessen, “The Oriental Maritime Space Port: China’s Sea-Based Expansion,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 16, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4196865/the-oriental-maritime-space-port-chinas-sea-based-expansion.

Jake Rinaldi, “China’s Role in a Future Korean War,” Parameters 55, no. 2 (2025), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss2/4.

Daniel Fu, “Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 25, no. 12, June 21, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/drills-and-experts-suggest-beijing-favors-blockade-on-longer-timeline.

Phillip C. Saunders and Melodie Ha, “Chinese Military Diplomacy,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives 19, June 23, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4222744/chinese-military-diplomacy.

Xiaoke Qi, “China’s Strategic Hinterland: Enhancing New-Quality Combat Capabilities in Sichuan,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 23, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4217375/chinas-strategic-hinterland-enhancing-new-quality-combat-capabilities-in-sichuan.

Ryan D. Martinson, “Exposed Undersea: PLA Navy Officer Reflections on China’s Not-So-Silent Service,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 24, 2025, https://cimsec.org/category/indo-pacific.

1. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “China Deploys 2 Aircraft Carriers to Western Pacific for the First Time,” USNI News, June 11, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/06/10/china-deploys-2-aircraft-carriers-to-western-pacific-for-the-first-time-uss-george-washington-leaves-japan-for-carrier-qualification.

2. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Dual Chinese Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups Continue to Operate in the Western Pacific,” USNI News, June 17, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/06/17/dual-chinese-aircraft-carrier-strike-groups-persist-to-operate-in-the-western-pacific.

3. “PLA Navy Aircraft Carriers Conduct Training in the Western Pacific,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), June 10, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16390751.html.

4. “2025年6月中旬国防部例行新闻发布” [Mid-June 2025 Ministry of National Defense Regular Press Conference], Ministry of National Defense (PRC), press release, June 13, 2025, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16391244.html.

5. “解放军双航母前出西太 美航母紧急回援” [PLA Dual Aircraft Carriers Push Forward into Western Pacific; U.S. Carrier Redeploys in Emergency Response], Huanqiu [Global Times], June 18, 2025, https://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/4N98e5bPeIO.

6. “China and South Africa Strengthen Defense Ties at 10th Meeting,” China Daily, June 11, 2025, available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16390894.html.

7. “China, South Africa Vow to Strengthen Military Cooperation,” Ministry of National Defense (PRC), June 10, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16390726.html.

8. BRICS is an intergovernmental organization comprising ten countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.

9. “Addition of Entities and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 15 CFR Part 744, Docket No. 240621-0171, RIN 0694-AJ66, July 3, 2024, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/03/2024-14635/addition-of-entities-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list.

10. “Four-Star Warns Pilots: Steer Clear of PRC-Backed Aviation Companies,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Air Forces Africa, February 28, 2025, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4082616/four-star-warns-pilots-steer-clear-of-prc-backed-aviation-companies.

11. “20th Meeting of ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations Kicks Off in Nanjing,” Ministry of National Defense (PRC), June 12, 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16391011.html.

12. Wei Yukuan and Jiang Guangyou, “以实践标准检验学习成效” [Using Practical Standards to Assess Learning Effectiveness], People’s Liberation Army Daily, June 13, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-06-13&paperNumber=07&articleid=957032.

13. “习近平在河南考察时强调：坚定信心推动高质量发展高效能治理 奋力谱写中原大地推进中国式现代化新篇章” [Xi Jinping Emphasizes During Henan Inspection: Firmly Promote High-Quality Development and Efficient Governance, Strive to Write a New Chapter of Chinese-Style Modernization in Central China], State Council (PRC), May 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202505/content_7024510.htm.

14. “经中央军委批准 中央军委办公厅印发《关于建立健全军队法治建设责任体系的通知》” [With the Approval of the Central Military Commission, the General Office of the Central Military Commission Issued the “Notice on Establishing and Improving the Responsibility System for the Construction of the Rule of Law in the Military”] People’s Liberation Army Daily, June 24, 2025, http://www.81.cn/jwtt/16392921.html.

15. Ibid.

16. Li Jian, Yao Zhihe, and Huang Yonggang, “无人机作战运用呼唤理论创新” [Drone Operations Demand Theoretical Innovation], People’s Liberation Army Daily, June 17, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-06-17&paperNumber=07&articleid=957292.

17. John S. Van Oudenaren and Peter W. Singer, “China’s Burgeoning Drone Arsenal Shows Power of Civil-Military Fusion,” Defense One, June 17, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/06/chinas-drone-arsenal-shows-power-civil-military-fusion/406118.

18. Xu Tao and Chen Li, “空军某基地常态化开展跨军兵种协同训练 平时是训练编组 战时是作战模块” [An Air Force Base Regularly Conducts Cross-Service Joint Training: Training Teams in Peacetime, Combat Modules in Wartime], People’s Liberation Army Daily, June 3, 2025, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-06-03&paperNumber=01&articleid=956306.

19. Zhao Xiangang and Zhong Jiaxiang, “无人机战场运用呈现新趋势” [New Trends in Battlefield Use of Drones], China Military Network, October 24, 2024, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16347192.html.

20. Xiao Tianliang, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2020), 137.